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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Lyons, Porter. M.A., Department of Political Science, Wright State University, 2018. 
Red Skies: The Impact of Environmental Protests in the People’s Republic of China, 2004-2016. 
 
 
 
How do increases in environmental protests in China impact increases in the 
implementation of environmental policies? Environmental protests in China are gaining traction. 
By examining these protests, this study analyzes forty-one protests and their impact on 
government enforcement of environmental regulations. Stratifying this study according to five 
areas (Beijing, Guangdong, Hunan, Jiangsu, and Sichuan), patterns began to emerge according to 
each area. Employing a framework William Gamson introduced (2009), this study analyzes the 
outcomes of environmental contention, including the use of co-optation and preemptive 
measures. It finds that the success or failure of a protest has much to do with the local 
government’s sense of social stability and the tactics protesters used. The information gleaned 
from this analysis helps anticipate how authoritarian governments (local and national) will 
continue to respond to environmental protests that are likely to continue to increase in number. 
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Chapter I  
Grassroots: The Bottom of the Middle Kingdom 
 
Introduction 
 
Mass environmental protests in nondemocracies are often met with government 
intervention, most often in the form of suppression. Nondemocratic political systems determine 
policy and regulation in almost all of spheres of life, frequently utilizing their ability to motivate 
rapid economic production above the health of the environment. Forces with more leverage in 
democracies, such as public opinion, civil society, and media, are not as productive or influential 
in the shadow of repressive elites. Steven Hess asserts that the autocrat is chiefly concerned with 
preserving power. Any type of resistance, symbolic or otherwise, must be met with swift action 
(Hess, 2013). Even the natural environment, at best, comes second to an autocratic regime’s firm 
hold on political and economic prowess, and, further, a stable society. Environmental protests 
across Thailand, Vietnam, and Russia exhibit how environmental protests operate in three 
modern authoritarian regimes. 
In response to the Vietnamese central government’s desire to foster rapid industrial 
growth akin to China, Vietnamese people have taken to forming blockades at factory entrances, 
such as one textile plant in Hanoi (Nyugen, 2017). In this instance of protest, police arrived and 
used water cannons to dissolve the crowd (Nyugen, 2017). Since the Thai coup of 2014, which 
placed the National Council for Peace and Order into power, loose environmental laws and 
regulation allow particularly harmful industries the power to produce quickly, even if it means 
harming the local environment (Corben, 2017). Naturally, this has led to localized protests across 
Thailand. Each of these regimes has responded to the protests, though the results of each 
response are not impactful. In the case of Thailand, officials have ordered some plants to reassess 
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their environmental impact, though with “lukewarm” regulations in place it appears as if the 
government is merely co-opting their citizens (Corben, 2017). In the Russian Federation, 
prominent activists have difficulty speaking out against President Vladimir Putin’s propaganda 
(Tamkin, 2017). It is common knowledge among environmental activists in Russia that they face 
“police intimidation, trumped up criminal charges, and prison” (Vidal, 2014). These cases paint a 
picture of struggle and hardship for any person standing up for the environment in their country. 
The People’s Republic of China (PRC), while maintaining authoritarian rule, may present a 
different story. 
 Worldwide, the PRC is the highest contributor of greenhouse gas emissions, accounting 
for just over 28% of global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in 2016 (Statista, 2017). However, 
China has also seen meteoric economic growth, averaging gross domestic product (GDP) growth 
at about 10% each year since the 1990s (The World Bank, 2017). The cost of this growth fell 
upon what used to be substantially clearer skies and rivers. The strangled environment taxes the 
health of Chinese citizens, who can be seen roaming the streets of China’s dense cities wearing 
masks to subvert the effects of air pollution. China’s rural inhabitants, whose agricultural 
livelihood depends on the condition of the soil and rivers, face streams of chemicals leaking into 
their crops and water resources. The long-term cost of continued environmental disregard is 
evident, but how willing is China to sacrifice economic progress for the sake of environmental 
health, and consequently the health of its citizens? And, to what end can this economy sustain 
progress without facing the fiscal detriments of ecological harm? 
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) slowly recognized the environmental crisis on its 
hands following Mao Zedong’s “campaigns of destruction” throughout the middle of the 20th 
century (Economy, 50). China passed its first bout of environmental regulations in the 1980s 
 
3 
 
under Deng Xiaoping, although they were at massive odds with Deng’s narrow focus on massive 
economic development, which required substantial amounts of natural resources. In 1984, the 
National Committee for Environmental Protection was established, approving its first law in 
1987, titled the Law on Air Pollution Prevention and Control of the People’s Republic of China 
(Managi & Kaneko, 2010). Over the next fourteen years, China would have “430 sets of 
environmental standards…at the central government level and 1,020 sets of laws, regulations, 
ordinances and rules at the local level” (Managi & Kaneko, 12). The CCP has also allowed the 
establishment of local environmental courts and registered nongovernmental organizations (Gao 
and Wang, 2010). However, legislation is only as useful as its level of implementation. China is 
subsequently notorious for its failure to administer the environmental legislation it holds itself to, 
sparking protests among its citizens as pollution climbs to dangerous levels. The question I am 
looking to uncover, at least partially, is how the surge in public environmental protests since 
2004 may impact the increase in environmental regulation in China. 
 Protests in China constitute an interesting case study, as government officials look down 
upon any sort of “widespread” protest and react swiftly to halt their operation and growth (Yang, 
2015). Environmental protests are, however, gaining traction in China and becoming more 
disruptive, and so, in order to maintain control, the CCP must facilitate appropriate responses. 
This possibly stems from the Party’s fear that the widespread protests may escalate quickly into a 
united social movement. Herein lies the importance of this research question. Positive responses 
to critical civilian protests are largely uncharacteristic of authoritarian administrations such as 
China, yet the CCP appears to make at least some concessions to the widespread protests against 
pollution (factory construction, chemical pollution, etc.). Examining environmental protests in 
China will answer the question of under which circumstances the voice of the public is heard, 
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and to what degree that voice can impact the enforcement of legislation. Its significance lies in 
whether or not we can surmise that civil society impacts government action, rather than issues 
the Chinese government has already placed on its national agenda. Moreover, research on 
environmental activism in authoritarian countries is lacking, especially in comparison to 
democracies. 
 The study of China’s civil society is extensive (Cai, 2010; Deng and O’Brien, 2014; 
Ding; 2002; Gilley, 2004; Green and Luehrmann, 2016; Heurlin, 2016; Lang and Xu, 2013; 
Ling, 2008; O’Brien and Li, 2006; Spires, 2011; Steinhardt and Wu, 2015; Thibault, 2011; Zhao, 
2008). In order to understand the measure of success attributed to grassroots activism, the 
relationship between China’s civil society and government bodies will require more analysis. 
Impact can be measured by examining how successful individual protests are. Moreover, 
charting regulation and policy patterns alongside each protest can help examine the 
responsiveness of the Chinese government. For example, if the results of this experiment show 
that concerns related to air pollution spark a majority of protest, an increase in air pollution 
regulation might suggest that officials are responding to the aims of protesters. The literature 
review will demonstrate how current scholarship sees protests and their impact in 
nondemocracies, including how we can recognize successful protests in the PRC.   
 
Literature Review 
Activism and social movements tend to be discussed in the same context, yet seeing as 
China’s widespread environmental activism has not grown into a “movement,” this literature 
review will only discuss activism and how it relates to Chinese environmental contention. A 
social movement can only be considered such if it expresses widespread, collective action 
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advocating for change in a particular sphere of social life. William Gamson refers specifically to 
the notion that a movement must work first to build a “collective identity” if it wishes to succeed 
(Gamson, 1991; 27). Often times, participants in social movements use similar tactics to achieve 
their goals and unify around a single message. Activism can instead refer to any form of social 
unrest aimed at promoting change in some areas of life. Collective identity does not need to be 
present. In China, it has not yet been adequately confirmed that even the worst cases of pollution 
lead to regular protests (Deng & Yang, 2013). However, keeping in mind that activism can and 
does lead to unified social movements, I will discuss literature that considers the origins of social 
movements. Political opportunity is one such theme that displays itself across much of the 
literature discussing both protest politics and social movements, alongside the measure of how 
much “impact” civil society exerts upon the legislation enforcement. The players involved in the 
arena of environmental contention are also worthy of attention. 
 
Political Opportunity and Impact 
 Political opportunity lends great importance to the objective analysis of social protests, as 
it provides a widely accepted and useful framework to research originating factors. This provides 
the foundation for legitimate research into contention (which refers to the pressure between 
governments and society practicing activism), as well as a basis to study the confounding idea 
that civil organization can exist in authoritarian administrations. Governing institutions have 
several factors that could provide the basis for activists to generate possible claims (McAdam, 
Tarrow, and Tilley, 2009). Across the literature surrounding this topic, one feature in particular 
stands out from the rest: there has been a change in “informal power relations” or “changes in the 
institutional structure” of the Chinese political system (McAdam, McCarthy, Zald, 1996). The 
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power dynamic of the government structure has changed and allows room for civil society 
organizations to operate. I describe this dynamic below. 
The Chinese central government has granted local governments a lot more leniency, 
especially in regards to worsening environmental conditions (Spires, 2011). This, in turn, gives 
local civil society the ability to engage in local politics. The result of this new ability has given 
rise to several other forms of civic engagement, namely “Not in my Backyard” activism 
(NIMBY), numerous forms of nongovernment organizations (NGOs), including registered, non-
profit, student environmental associations, and the infamous governmentally organized NGOs, 
which require NGOs to register for a sponsor within the Chinese government (Yang, 2005). 
According to research gathered by Jennifer Turner for the China Environmental Series, the total 
growth in these NGOs together has dramatically increased between 1994 and 2004 (Yang, 2005). 
This provides the basis and the claims necessary to discuss policy impact in the environmental 
realm. A combination of rising environmental concerns and government sympathy over those 
concerns provide fertile land for these associations to grow.  
Additionally, formal power relations become more blurred because of the prominence 
given to local governance. Across several case studies, the roles lawyers, civil organizations or 
protesting groups, government agencies, and even government officials play each contribute to 
the ultimate success, or failure, of a case. For example, an anti-incinerator protest beginning in 
2005 in the Haidian district of Beijing demonstrates the multitude of actors necessary for the 
success of environmental protests. The smog and smell the waste incinerator produced attracted 
the attention of protesters in the form of bulletin board displays and mobilization near 
government offices (Lang and Xu, 2013). For example, people living near the construction site 
displayed banners stating, “In the name of the elderly, mothers and children, please do not build 
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the incinerator plant here!” (Lang and Xu, 2013; 836). Not long after, lawyers and the State 
Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) arrived to assess the legality of the 
incinerator’s operation in the locale, while petitions flooded the desks of local government 
officials. The Haidian government postponed the incinerator project for reconsideration until the 
Beijing Olympic Games had ended, and eventually closed the incinerator down (Lang and Xu).  
 The Haidian incinerator case typifies a couple of characteristics typical of a contentious 
environmental episode in China. First, the case did not mention NGO involvement, clarifying the 
distinction between civilian and NGO protests. Departments in the Chinese government typically 
sponsor NGOs, and are therefore subject to scrutiny should the NGO become involved in 
protests (Gilley, 2004). Second, it highlights the multi-faceted hand of environmental protection 
enforcement, showcasing the throng of explanatory factors that could have focused the most 
impact on the government’s decision to relocate the incinerator. The case shows the 
government’s hesitancy to engage in civilian dissent while the international community watches, 
as highlighted by Haidian’s initial project postponement until after the 2008 Beijing Olympics. 
Again, external influences might have made the most impact on government action in this case, 
lending further importance to the study of successful social movements and protests across 
nondemocracies. 
 “Movement success” analysis is, in large part, attributed to William Gamson. Again, the 
situation in China has not garnered enough national unity to achieve a movement, yet the 
magnitude and size of protests across China allows the application of movement study, 
framework, and terminology. Gamson claims that success is better thought of and measured as “a 
set of outcomes” (Gamson, 2009; 414). This method of attribution is closely tied to how success 
can be measured across several of the case studies in this study. Lang and Xu’s study of anti-
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incinerator campaigns measures the outcomes of such contention in China along a spectrum of 
other outcomes contributed to “ecological modernization” in waste management (Lang and Xu, 
2013). Deng and O’Brien’s article on Societies of Senior Citizens looks to the successes and 
failures of popular environmental protests in rural China as a method of measuring the 
plausibility of continued protest and efficacy (Deng and O’Brien, 2014 & O’Brien and Li, 2006). 
Impact is an important aspect of contentious political research. In general, how does one 
measure “impact” in the context of Chinese protests? Existing literature on this topic in China is 
scant, although case studies may present some conclusions. In large part, the literature on 
environmental protests has utilized case studies to demonstrate the effectiveness of resistance. 
However, several documented cases label the relocation of environmentally harmful 
infrastructure (waste incinerators, chemical factories, etc.) as successful. While this could be 
considered a victory for the localized protest, the relocation does not fall in line with legislation 
that reduces harmful infrastructure. Therefore, only cases that succeeded in shutting down or 
suspending harmful infrastructure are considered for research on implementation of 
environmentally friendly policy in this study. Moreover, reported cases of protests have 
decreased in recent years due to the so-called “Arab Spring” uprisings; the CCP has placed new 
restrictions on reporters, lawyers, and anyone labeled an activist (Jacobs, 2011). This could 
prove detrimental to research opportunities in this topic as scholars try to understand where 
environmental contention in China is headed, and even the accuracy to which that can be 
determined. 
 Classifying impact this way typifies the outcome structure of these articles, and presents a 
trend among environmental contention research in China. If this is brought back out to the 
general field of contentious politics, the lack of clarity concerning the direct impact in Chinese 
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environmental contention is clear to see. Lang and Xu go so far as to admit that they are more 
cautious when approaching the topic of impact. Rather, they prefer to point out correlations 
instead of providing conclusions and allowing the reader to draw deductions themselves, noting 
the government’s drive to “increase waste sorting and recycling in Guangzhou…apparently 
energized by the successful protests against waste incineration” (Lang and Xu, 2013; 844). 
Steinhardt and Wu begin their article about popular environmental contention in China by noting 
their own wariness with stating a protest’s influence on government policy, focusing rather on 
the increase and evolution of contentious politics in China (Steinhardt and Wu, 2015).  With this 
in mind, the prevailing approach concerning “impact” is to exercise caution, although authors 
look more toward a protest’s success and failure in concluding their hypotheses alongside 
Gamson’s successful movement framework. 
Assuming that NGO existence in authoritarian regimes depends at least in part that a 
portion of NGOs are facilitated through government monitoring mechanisms (Böhmelt, 2014), 
the leap to engagement in non-contentious politics on the part of most NGOs is necessary 
(Thibaut, 2011). NGOs veer away from protests in order to ensure their survival, a necessary 
tightrope in authoritarian regimes since civilians are free to employ more aggressive tactics 
(Spires, 2011). This disconnect, in itself, reveals a common trend displayed across literature for 
this topic: for the most part, official organization and short-term civilian mobilization are not 
discussed in congruence with one another. 
The overall study of social movements and political activism needs to be addressed in 
authoritarian China, where civil society is a lot less prone to opposition towards the state 
(Thibaut, 2011). Noticeably, research in the area of environmental contention leans toward the 
role that NGOs play in environmental governance, whereas less tangible research exists in terms 
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of unaffiliated mass protests. Clear connections are made in literature determining the 
effectiveness of NGOs in environmental governance, usually through the use of case studies. The 
unaffiliated are not given so much clarity.  
Most of the literature showcases environmental civil unrest as persistent and long lasting, 
although the outcome of “villager protests” is not distinctly shown. A case in Dongyang 
demonstrates villagers’ discontent with a local industrial park, their turmoil arising from the 
affect the pollution may have on their offspring (Deng and Yang, 2013). However, when 
officials did not delay the factory’s construction, villagers instead turned their attention to the 
effect construction would have on land degradation in the area (Deng and Yang, 2013). The 
protest lasted from 2001 until 2005, and included several petitions as well as violent, destructive 
outbreaks from nearby villagers such as the destruction of the interior portion of one of the 
chemical factories (Deng and Yang, 2013 & Deng and O’Brien, 2014). The final result came 
when the affected county shut down eleven factories in the industrial park, although there is not a 
clear picture as to what measure of impact the protest had on the decision. Shortly before the 
closing announcement, the issue brought international attention (Deng and O’Brien, 2014). 
External pressures, such as media outlets or international organizations, could have provoked the 
government to make haste in their decision. 
 The literature is lacking in recent cases of environmental protests to propel the topic 
forward, mostly due to the restrictions the CCP has placed on reporting. Recent case studies 
barely make it to the late 2000s, and the most helpful and complete case studies come from the 
early 2000s. This is not so much a fault of the scholarship as a problem inherent from studying 
China, especially since reporting laws have been tightened and strictly enforced within the past 
few years under General Secretary and President Xi Jinping, “the most authoritarian leader since 
 
11 
 
Mao” (Osnos, 2015). Fortunately, for those wishing to continue the study of environmental 
contention in China, independent bloggers have taken to reporting incidents on social media 
sites. Access to foreign reporting is another outlet available for research; although informational 
inaccuracy, such as number of protest participants or the nature of the protest, can play a part in 
tainting the validity of data gathered this way. 
The role of NGOs contributes to a significant amount of political and societal strength for 
those wishing to take part in shaping policy. Not only do the local and national governments 
allow, though in separate forms, both registered and non-registered NGOs to operate, they allow 
them to engage in social issues (Spires, 2011). Fortunately, both registered and nonregistered 
NGOs can play a part in influencing policy. For example, some have gone on to claim that the 
multitude of registered, or government-sponsored NGOs, give an outlet for the Chinese people to 
voice their concerns to the government, and are therefore healthy for Chinese society (Saich, 
2000). Unfortunately, due to a lack of trust in the Chinese government on the part of individual 
citizens, there is subsequently not a lot of faith placed in sponsored NGOs (Spires, 2011). As a 
result, political drama runs rampant throughout even the “nongovernmental” sphere (Gilley, 
2004), mostly a result of mistrust or fear of how the government might respond in kind (Spires, 
2011).  
A considerable gap in the literature revolving around this falls in the discussion of actual 
environmental legislation, and attributing protest success to instances that achieve success in 
only the relocation of environmentally hazardous infrastructure, instead of its cancellation. When 
considering climate change as a national (and even global) issue, the enforcement of national 
legislation is the overall end that will achieve China’s goals set for climate change reduction. Not 
examining Chinese legislation alongside protesters’ goals and aims creates a narrowed view of 
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the entire situation unfolding in the legal area of China’s environmental realm. Placing civil 
society’s goals alongside Chinese legislation would also create easily measurable data points. 
Moreover, as Steinhardt and Wu have mentioned, viewing a protest’s success in a localized 
frame can have troubling results for the country as a whole (Steinhardt and Wu). It is unhelpful, 
though useful in some contexts, to attribute success to an anti-incinerator protest that succeeded 
in moving the waste incinerator to a community that will likely endure the harmful effects of the 
incinerator.   
 
Methodology and Research Design 
 What impact has environmental contention had in China on the enforcement of 
environmental regulation? I expect to find that: 
 
1. As protests increase in coastal areas, environmental regulation will also increase. I expect 
this result because development and population is concentrated here most. With the 
combination of higher population and higher quality of education, the government officials 
are perhaps held to a higher standard. 
 
2. As protests increase in continental areas, environmental regulation will not change due to 
decreased population density in these areas. Size matters to Chinese officials, so a lack of 
dense protest demonstrations would, I expect, lessen the incentive to enforce environmental 
regulation. 
 
3. As protests concerning air pollution increase, overall environmental regulation across the 
provinces selected will increase. I expect this result because of China’s responsive attitude 
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toward popular discontent alongside high numbers of protest toward smog and other forms 
of air pollution. 
 
This research performs an experiment in which I select cases of environmental protests 
ranging from 2004 until December 2016. The China Daily (US Edition), China Digital Times 
website, and the Environmental Justice Atlas (EJ Atlas) provide ample amounts of cases to use in 
order to determine the outcome of the research. China Daily, a state-run news outlet operating 
out of Beijing, reports cases in a manner in line with standard publicizing, disseminating 
information about where and when the protest was and the actors involved. China Digital Times 
was founded in Berkeley, California in 2003 as a response to growing Internet usage and acts 
independently from the Chinese government to advocate for “uncensored” Chinese news. This 
outlet pulls from other news outlets, such as China Daily and Xinhua, to report a more 
comprehensive look at its reportings. The EJ Atlas works to increase the transparency to users of 
ecological conflicts worldwide, gathering data from institutions including NGOs, academic 
circles, state data sets, and several other sources (Temper et al., 2015).  
Utilizing the distinctions of these media outlets this research will seek to demonstrate two 
claims: a) environmental contention has increased throughout the 2004-2016 and b) governments 
have increasingly conceded to, either partially or in whole, the desires of civil actors. This will 
serve as the primary relationship for my research. I will examine whether or not as cases of 
environmental protests have increased, so too has government implementation of environmental 
regulation. I will examine five provinces during the given time period in order to obtain the 
results needed for the hypotheses: Sichuan, Henan, Beijing, Jiangsu, and Guangdong. These five  
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selections represent distinct stratifications for this research including north and south, coastal and 
continental, and urban and rural divisions.  
Beginning in 2004, I will select three to five cases (as are available) per year through 
2016. The case reports will include the type of protest and the actors involved in them, as well as 
the time of year and the specific location. I will record the announced result for each individual 
case, such as the cancellation of the construction of a garbage incinerator. Since this research 
seeks to identify the effectiveness of environmental contention in China, I will seek the medium-
term results of each case. For example, I will consider a garbage incinerator that began 
construction in 2005, but was cancelled through an announcement made by the local government 
in response to mass protests. However, in 2008 a newspaper reports that the garbage incinerator 
will resume construction. The conclusion for this case would be that the protest was ineffective 
and regulation has not increased. I will code demonstrations as effective if they meet certain 
factors, including a government response to cancel construction of plants or incinerators, and no 
further cases have been reported. I can also track this by comparing the statistics the China 
Statistical Yearbook provides and the cases of success in each protest. While this does not 
establish direct causation, the combination of statistical correlation and the cancellation of 
environmentally detrimental construction would show believable causation, at least partially. 
Due to the attempt to randomize case selection, I attempt to a make a larger inference from the 
forty-one cases I examine from 2004 to 2016. I will select cases throughout varying times of the 
year, given their availability.  
As I discussed in the literature review, several articles begin with environmentalism and 
its role in political protests. Framed this way, these articles tend to focus more on the abilities of 
protesters to succeed in an authoritarian context, hence the study of China. However, this 
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detracts from the subject of environmentalism, and instead allows room for only what seems like 
the spread of democratic rights throughout China. In order to increase focus on 
environmentalism, an urgent topic of study especially for global superpowers, framing these 
issues in environmental terms gives the field a more complete understanding of the status of 
environmental regulation in China. This can be done through an increase in the presence of 
policy research and data gathered from Chinese policy, compared to the demonstrations and 
protests occurring in light of the China’s environmental crisis. 
Environmental governance in China has a longer history than one might expect, 
considering its worldwide notoriety for pollution issues. China started its initial attempt at an 
environmental protection law (EPL) in 1979, by recognizing the need to “safeguard the 
environment” and promote a “legal network for environmental protection” (Economy, 100). 
However, the rhetoric surrounding China throughout the rest of the 20th century revolved around 
development, not environmental protection (Economy, 102). Revisions have been made to the 
EPL throughout the handful of decades since its trial run in the late 1970s, most of which focus 
responsibility of managing the environment on local governments. For example, a 1989 
provision to the EPL obligated local governments in China to “establish environmental 
standards…in areas under their jurisdiction” and take steps to ensure these standards are 
enforced (Palmer, 793). 
Within the past few years, the National People’s Congress (NPC) has revised the EPL to 
give more responsibility and initiative to local governments. The most recent revision was 
actually the first time that the public held the ability to influence environmental law (Zhang et 
al., 2016). Most importantly, the newest revisions give Environmental Protection Bureaus 
(EPBs) “governing powers” in the form of recommendations to local governments (Zhang et al., 
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2016). However, influence through local governments is only as productive as the local 
government’s willingness to implement the recommendation at hand. This highlights another 
aspect of environmental governance issues at the local levels of government. 
Applying William Gamson’s framework can help accomplish a clearer image of the 
stance the CCP has taken toward groups of environmental protesters. In his “challenged 
outcome” framework, Gamson identifies four types of outcomes attributed to social movements. 
This same framework can be used in the instance of social protest research. By placing particular 
protests, or “mass incidents,” throughout the selected timeframe into one of these four groups 
(full response, preemption, co-optation, collapse), this topic can benefit from a more 
parsimonious and beneficial examination as protest challenges and government acceptance are 
paired up against one another (Gamson, 2009). This fits both the popular “success/failure” model 
that many authors in this field have grown accustomed to, while adding another element of post-
protest government response that assists in determining the initial impact of the protest. 
 The other side of this question considers the enforcement of environmental regulation. 
For this section of research, I look for increases in national environmental regulation throughout 
the timeframe of this study. Increased environmental regulation will include cases of factory 
inspection, closing down environmentally detrimental infrastructure, cracking down on non-
compliant government officials and requiring emissions reporting from relevant actors in the 
private sector. I expect to find that the type of protest in some provinces will correlate with a 
type of environmental regulation at the national level. For example, in provinces particularly 
prone to garbage incinerator use, I expect to find that most protests object to their construction, 
subsequently petitioning the government to end construction or dismantle the incinerators. This 
would lead to an increase in official regulation concerning the discharge of harmful dioxins (the 
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culprit produced from waste incinerators) in that province, and subsequently demonstrate the 
effectiveness of environmental contention in light of increasing external pressure to reduce 
emissions. 
 William Gamson’s framework defining movement success suggests that research 
examines the success or failure of a protest or movement as “a set of outcomes” (Gamson, 414). 
The outcomes Gamson describes are helpful in categorizing each individual protest occurrence. 
By labeling each of the cases according to those outcomes, they can help explain which 
provinces are more likely to integrate environmental regulation in response to protests. The 
framework utilizes “acceptance” to show whether the antagonist accepts the rhetoric of the 
protest. Environmental contention has seen widespread acceptance among Chinese elites, so this 
research will examine the “new advantages” portion more in depth. Depending on whether or not 
this research finds that Chinese civil society has received advantages from their actions will, 
according to Gamson’s framework, subsequently help illustrate whether or not the Chinese 
government is taking firm actions toward limiting harmful atmospheric emissions, or adopting 
the environmental agenda as a propagandist tool to appease both internal and external groups. 
This framework will additionally help classify results from each individual case, producing 
results of the status of each province’s advantages throughout the course of the selected 
timeframe. I expect some provinces might exhibit acceptance of environmental regulation on 
behalf of local officials while simultaneous attempts are made to continue ignoring regulation, 
while others may demonstrate the opposite. I discuss this at length in Chapter III. 
 International pressures and national economic concerns can also explain the uptick in 
China’s positive environmental reaction. China’s image abroad and a healthy economy are 
cornerstones to a regime’s influence, so reactions based on these factors are to be expected. It is 
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important to understand the other influences that could help shape China’s present and future 
actions in the realm of environmental regulation. Economic productivity has long taken a blow 
due to an increase in smog and air pollution in cities that are particularly prone to these forms of 
emission (Managi & Kaneko, 2006). In order to curb the annual drop in economic growth caused 
by pollutants, China has put in place measures such as wastewater treatment plants to increase 
efficient use of natural resources that would otherwise remain polluted and hazardous (Managi & 
Kaneko, 2006). However, examining the impact that an otherwise oppressed group has on actual 
enforcement of Chinese regulation remains the most important question to answer in order to 
understand the growing influence of protests in authoritarian states. 
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Chapter II 
Growing Green 
 
Introduction 
Incidents of environmental protests across the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have 
been rising year to year, as indicated in a handful of reports in the Chinese media. The Pew 
Research Center conducted a 2015 poll regarding Chinese citizens’ primary concerns, air 
pollution and water pollution fell in the number two and three spots, respectively, underneath 
“corrupt officials” (Wike and Parker, 2015). According to the South China Morning Post, 
environmental protests have grown around 30% each year since 1996, rising 120% from 2010 to 
2011 (Chun and Lin, 2014; Kennedy, 2012; Liu, 2013; South China Morning Post, 2013). The 
State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) in China reported around 50,000 
environmental protests in 2005 (Go, Suzuki, and Xiaoxia, 2008). It was difficult locating 
information that showed more specific trends concerning pollution type, however, the EJ Atlas 
presented sixty-one cases of reported protest across the continent that fall within the period I use 
in this study. Of those sixty-one cases, thirty-six reported air pollution protests, which accounts 
for over half of the reported cases EJ Atlas was able to locate all over China. The same applies 
for the cases in this study, which contains twenty-five cases of air pollution protest out of forty-
one cases (across just five provinces).  
While the collective environmental conscience in China has not yet evolved into any sort 
of formal movement, one can argue that the growth of environmental protests rivals infamous 
cases of mass discontent over land confiscation or labor disputes. This lends great importance to 
the study of available environmental protest data, as well as its ability to significantly impact 
environmental regulation implementation (something that labor or “land grab” protests have 
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ultimately failed at influencing). The data presented in this chapter highlights trends in instances 
of environmental protests from 2004-2016 in Beijing, Guangdong, Hunan, Jiangsu, and Sichuan. 
Changes in environmental regulation and reported levels of emissions and pollutants are 
presented for each area. 
 First, I demonstrate the outcomes of two instances of massive pollution protest in China. 
One instance, a large-scale protest against a paraxylene (Px) plant in Dalian, presents an example 
of the failure to impact government action to uphold environmental regulation, despite tens of 
thousands of participants. A second case took place further south in Shanghai, in which 
approximately 50,000 people gathered at one point to protest another Px plant, although this 
culminated in what may be viewed as a success for protesters. Analyzing these two cases will 
help clarify how the most prominent environmental protests start, endure, and end.  
 In the summer of 2011, Typhoon Muifa made for Dalian, a large city in the northeastern 
province of Liaoning. Ocean waves pounded the dikes protecting Jinzhou Industrial Park. Storm 
drainage exposed the presence of a Px plant within the city limits once portions of the dikes 
crumbled away (Watts, 2011). This discovery was especially contentious to Dalian citizens due 
to its proximity to the city; the plant was built only twenty kilometers from the center of the city 
(Hao, 2011). Ten thousand protesters gathered to object the existence of the plant soon after 
(Hao). A BBC report on this protest highlighted the banner protesters held, one that read, “Give 
me back my home and garden! Px out! Protect Dalian!” (BBC, 2011). The initial result of this 
protest was standard for a gathering of this magnitude. Dalian’s local government responded 
with a statement announcing the plant’s closure and a plan to move it to a nearby island, with 
proper distance from Dalian in accordance with environmental regulations (Temper, del Bene 
and Martinez-Alier, 2015). At first, this case could be considered successful, however, the 
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medium-term view indicates that the plant never actually ceased Px production. The planned 
relocation never occurred (Watts, 2012). It is rumored that officials did not want to shut down 
the plant, because doing so would have resulted in massive income loss (Watts). While a 
seemingly swift government response settled this case of protest and eased public complaints, 
this case cannot be considered a success. The plant continued its operation within city limits. 
 A Px protest in Shanghai’s Jinshan district may be viewed as more successful. Similar to 
Dalian, the protest comprised of at least ten thousand people in a coastal, urban populace with at 
least 5 million residents. However, unlike the former case, this protest occurred prior to the 
construction of the plant. This plant was to be built in another part of Shanghai originally, but 
was moved to the Jinshan district after several construction accidents in the former area (Temper 
et al., 2015). Following rumors that the Px plant would be built in the Jinshan district, tens of 
thousands of protesters gathered, bearing banners that shouted “PX Out!” (Temper et al.) 
Officials later announced that the plant would not be built. 
The difference between these two protests is significant. From it, we can observe a 
variance among many of the cases in this experiment; several incidents take issue with proposed 
construction as opposed to infrastructure that is already in place. How do activists impact 
enforcement for a factory that does not yet exist? Often times, Px plants pose the most significant 
environmental hazards. Shoddy construction and careless operation can lead to enormous 
disasters, such as explosions and the subsequent, several-day long oil fires the explosions 
produce (Jing & Huang, 2015). Moreover, completed Px projects normally endure as sources of 
significant environmental harm (Wang, 2016). It is therefore valid to assume that incidents will 
break out against these proposed projects. Preemptive protests with regards to consistently 
violating infrastructure or industries will be considered for this experiment.  
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  Each side of the research equation is presented in this chapter, including provincial 
variance and occurrence, the “type” of each protest (air, water, or soil), and whether each protest 
can be considered successful. I categorize this information in the appendix. The appendix details 
several important aspects of each of the forty-one cases that are not referenced in the main body 
of this thesis. It breaks down each case into the relevant details examined in this study, such as 
the reported site, pollution type, size of the protest, and a brief outline discussing the result. Each 
result gives some indication as to which “outcome” connects to the case. 
For example, a 2004 protest located in Shutangshan, Hunan (Case 2) ended with the 
“preemption” outcome, in which there were “new advantages” (the factory or plant was moved), 
but no government “acceptance,” meaning the broader goal of the protesters was not met. 
Appendix A provides the most specific location reported (county, city, village, etc.) and then 
reports the pollution type, with a brief description attributing the pollution type to a specific 
industry for all forty-one cases. In the case of the Hunan protest, protesters targeted an Allicin 
plant, which had been pumping sulfurous fumes into the air as a result of its Allicin production. 
By 2004, protesters were storming the factory at night to attempt to shut down the factory 
(Temper et al., 2015). After hundreds of people deliberated with the local government, the 
factory was relocated. This short account reflects the important details pertinent to the appendix. 
Serious protesting began in 2004 in Shutangshan with at least hundreds of protesters. This 
outcome, as will be discussed later, falls under the “preemption” category because the factory 
had only been relocated, instead of shut down. The rest of the cases in the appendix follow this 
method. 
Then, each case is examined for whether or not it upholds current environmental 
regulation. Only regulation that existed at the time of the protest will be considered for the 
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enforcement variable. Protesters that gather to object the construction or operation of a factory or 
plant that meets environmental regulation are not included in this experiment. This data 
represents the quantitative aspect of the experiment, and will be used in Chapter III to analyze 
the measure of impact on enforcement, and subsequently molded into William Gamson’s 2009 
“Challenged Outcome Framework.” This will help determine to what degree the Chinese 
government is co-opting or preempting the instances of activism in my selected cases.  
 For the data in this experiment, I selected forty-one cases of environmental protest from 
English reported news sites, in most instances from China Daily (US Edition) and the EJ Atlas, 
as well as cases I found through other news sources, such as Radio Free Asia and the New York 
Times. Of the forty cases, seventeen came from Guangdong, seven from Sichuan, six from 
Hunan, five from Beijing, and five from Jiangsu. Cases were found inside the search functions of 
each reporting site, except in the case of EJ Atlas in which a map was used to pinpoint instances 
of protests. I used search terms such as “pollution” or “environment(al),” “protest” or “mass 
incident,” “factory construction,” “incinerator,” “smog,” “waste” or “river waste,” “chemical,” 
and the subsequent province for which I was searching. After I exhausted all case searches, only 
2004, 2005, and 2006 did not meet the mark for the three to five case range; each year had only 
two (English) reported protests across all five provinces in this thesis. 
 Most articles contained the information needed to fulfill the quantitative components of 
this experiment, including the date the protest started, the type of pollution (air, water, and soil) 
associated with the protest, its size, and whether or not the protest can be considered successful. 
As mentioned in Chapter I, I only consider a protest successful if it succeeded in a government 
statement declaring the cancellation of plans to construct harmful infrastructure, shut down the 
offending building, or measures were imposed upon the offender to reduce pollutants in 
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compliance with regulation. Cases that succeeded in relocating the offender are not considered 
successful in terms of complying with environmental regulation. If the site was in violation of 
current regulation, then solely relocating the site does not fulfill the standard as delineated in this 
experiment. Furthermore, the size of the protest is included to show the case’s status as a “mass 
incident,” which should generally include at least one hundred people. Normally, a news article 
reported size estimates such as “hundreds of protesters” or “over ten thousand participants,” so 
these will be the numbers shown in this chapter’s tables. 
  
Data Examining Success and Failure across Provinces and Pollution Type 
Several articles disclosed the type of pollution through the identified complaint of each 
protest. For example, an article may report that protesters gathered at the site of a garbage 
incinerator to dispute the heavy smog settling around their village. In this instance, the source of 
the complaint is clear. Other articles did not specify the complaint, so the case is categorized 
according to whatever type of pollution is most often identified with the site. In the case of the 
garbage incinerator, for example, if the coverage left out specific protest complaints, such as 
smog, I assume that this protest was in regards to air pollution, or the potential for air pollution.  
Figure 2.1 details cases per province, looking at instances of air, water, and soil pollution 
protests. Keeping in mind that this dataset excludes several thousand unreported (or reported, 
though only in Chinese media) mass incidents, I believe this chart is fairly representative for 
what I am studying in this thesis. These cases represent the largest protests across the provinces, 
and are therefore likely to have the most influence on government action. The attention garnered 
by these reported cases feature hundreds, if not thousands, of participants. If regulation is not 
enforced even among the most visible of cases, this paints a dreary picture for other instances of 
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Chinese activism. If more protests are successful than not, then odds increase for success in those 
cases that were not located or not reported for this experiment. My hypothesis examining 
government attention and responsiveness to air pollution, for example, hopes to indicate that 
officials respond with more policy implementation to the most common form of protest (air 
pollution). If this experiment were to demonstrate relative success for cases of air pollution, this 
could indicate that most cases of air pollution protest experience relative success. If the 
experiment were to demonstrate failure under this category, then this could signify the opposite. 
Time seemed to have little bearing on the ease of locating cases. Instances of protest were 
slightly easier to find in the latter years of the timeline, as I obtained at least four cases between 
2014 and 2016. In most years I only found three cases of protest in the areas selected. I suspect 
that as the environment worsened that there would be more protests, and subsequently more 
reported protests across the provinces I chose for this experiment. Moreover, as expected, air 
pollution incidents were the dominant form of protest for most provinces (all except Jiangsu, 
which only had one case of air pollution protest). Guangdong, the province with the most 
reported cases, had over 75% of their incidents related to air pollution. Even Sichuan, a Western 
continental province, saw over 60% of their protests under air pollution.  
The charts on page seven stratify protest success and failure across the five provinces 
included in the experiment, as well as instances of success and failure across the type of protests, 
namely air, water, and soil. I located the result of each protest through either the concluding text 
of the news report, which often indicated the result of the protest, or referencing another article 
that followed the story and reported the result. Cases of protest that succeeded in forcing the 
offender to relocate are not considered successful under the outline of this experiment. The 
protesters may have achieved what they desired, but if the offender broke regulation, then 
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enforcement cannot be applied because the industry planned on carrying out their plans 
elsewhere. Protests that triumphed in suspending operations of the polluter, forced the polluter to 
observe cleaner industrial practices, or shut down the polluter all together are considered 
successes.  
Successful cases of environmental protests in Beijing, Guangdong, and Hunan were fairly 
even in occurrence with cases of failure between 2005 and 2016, as demonstrated in Figure 2.2. 
The same cannot be said about Jiangsu and Sichuan. Jiangsu saw complete success throughout 
that period, while Sichuan saw only one case of success (the rest are considered protest failure). 
This data has some implications for the coastal and continental classification discussed in the 
hypotheses in Chapter I. Guangdong and Jiangsu, two coastal provinces, are the only provinces 
with more cases of success than failure, though it should be noted that Guangdong saw only one 
more successful case than the cases of reported failure. The continental provinces, namely Hunan 
and Sichuan, both experienced more cases of protest failure than success, with special attention 
to Sichuan, which saw several more failures than successes. 88% of Sichuan’s cases ended in 
failure. Beijing is a special case, as it is fairly close to the coast and an overwhelmingly large 
metropolis, but it is technically landlocked. Because it is China’s capital, and therefore most 
representative of Chinese central policy, this experiment includes Beijing in the coastal category, 
since it is the most likely case to see the most environmental regulation enforcement. Therefore, 
Beijing is the only case in this category, alongside Jiangsu and Guangdong, to experience more 
cases of failure than success. 
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Figure 2.1 Cases of Air, Water, and Soil Pollution per Province1 (N=41) 
 
Sourced from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/annualdata/ 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1 This figure only reports those cases examined in this study 
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Fig. 2.2: Instances of Protest Success and Failure per Province, 2004-20162 (N=41) 
 
Fig. 2.3: Air, Water, and Soil Protest Success and Failure, 2004-20163 (N=41)  
                                                        
2 These figures only report those cases examined in this study 
3 These figures are sourced from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/annualdata/ 
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Data Examining Pollutants 
Statistics examining the amount of pollution across the provinces should be examined as 
well, not only to discover if they are increasing or decreasing, but also to see at what rate 
emissions are changing alongside cases of successful or failed protests. As discussed in Chapter 
I, this information will assist in determining if successful protests contribute to environmental 
regulation enforcement. In order to analyze which statistics to look for that accurately reflect 
whether protests are assisting with a change in emissions output, I examined the primary 
pollutants associated with air, water, and soil pollution, and subsequently the availability of the 
statistics with regard to those pollutants.  
The “Particulate Matter less than 2.5 micrometers” measure, or PM2.5, is a common 
form of measuring air quality (EPA, 2016). Particulate matter describes the size of very small 
and potentially harmful particles that form due to chemical compounds, such as sulfur dioxide, 
reacting with each other in the air. A size of 2.5 micrometers is dangerous in terms of the smog 
these particles create and their ability to settle deep inside respiratory systems (EPA, 2016). 
Exposure to PM2.5 has been scientifically proven to influence health adversely. In one study, 
researchers concluded that for every significant increase in PM2.5 contact, particulate matter-
related mortality also increased in that area 2.8% (Kloog et al., 2013). However, in order to 
gauge the potential reduction in emissions from power plants or factories, sulfur dioxide (SO2) 
presence should be examined. SO2 is a compound more closely associated with power plant and 
factory emissions, alongside carbon dioxide. SO2 is also an emission found in motor vehicle 
pollutants, although a recent study conducted by the Chinese Academy of Sciences claims that 
motor vehicle emissions account for only about four percent of air pollution in Beijing, whereas 
SO2 emissions from plants or factories account for about twenty-five percent (Piao, 2014). 
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Therefore, the data I collect concerning SO2 emissions represent, for the most part, emissions 
from power plants or factories. 
As is seen in Figure 2.3, cases of protests with regards to air pollution were the largest in 
number throughout the chosen time period. Data and information regarding air pollutants were 
easiest to find as a result. Water and soil pollution presented less information, and in the case of 
soil pollution, I was unable to locate any consistent data reporting soil pollutants over time. The 
only potential source of soil pollution came from examining solid waste amounts, although there 
were either not enough data points to display an accurate picture of soil pollution trends, or any 
specific differentiation between hazardous and non-hazardous solid waste. As a result, there are 
not any charts displaying trends of soil pollution change. 
However, I was able to locate one consistent source of water pollutants that can assist in 
determining impact in a manner consistent with the information I collected regarding SO2 
emissions. Chemical Oxide Demand (COD) is a measure used to determine the amount of 
oxygen a certain area of water can take in, in order to break down both organic and inorganic 
materials. The higher the COD level, the less likely the water is able to break down harmful 
discharge, such as wastewater (Mancy, K. H., 1971). The COD discharge measure provides the 
ability to determine the health of each province’s water sources, and these sources’ ability to 
break down discharge from factories, power plants, and other infrastructure that disposes of 
wastewater. I expect this measure may slightly change with effective protests, though because of 
the bounty of domestic wastewater, I will look more towards actual policy implementation to 
uncover the impact of protests over water sources.  
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Fig. 2.4: Sulfur Dioxide Concentration per Provincial Capital, 2004-20154 (N=41) 
 
Sourced from National Bureau of Statistics of China, 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/annualdata/ 
  
                                                        
4 This figure only reports those cases examined in this study 
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The National Bureau of Statistics of China has published datasets in the China Statistical 
Database (CSD) every year since 1996. The CSD houses several datasets ranging from living 
conditions to foreign trade to environmental health.  The data from the Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5 
were obtained from the “Environmental Protection” category. In each category are several 
subcategories. For example, within the “Environmental Protection” dataset, subcategories like 
“Emission and Treatment of Waste Gas by Region” and “Ambient Air Quality by City” are 
included. I chose to present graphs of the data ranging from 2004-2015, as 2016 data has not 
been published yet. Most of the data across the timeline stayed consistent, although differences 
in subcategories provide some challenges. For example, while gathering statistics regarding the 
volume of sulfur dioxide present in the air per province, new subcategories replaced ones I had 
been using beginning in the 2010 report, and the database presented sulfur dioxide concentration 
emitted by industry and consumers as separate tables, whereas 2011-2015 presented the 
concentration as one collective figure.  
In order to address this problem, I provide two charts that outline concentration of sulfur 
dioxide: Figure 2.4 examines the concentration of sulfur dioxide in the capital cities of each 
province in this experiment, and Figure 2.5 presents sulfur dioxide volume for each province as a 
whole. Furthermore, examining the capitals as separate from the province allows a distinct 
perspective comparing how well the capitals (and subsequently the most populated cities for 
each province examined in this thesis) fare in terms of air quality versus the rest of the province. 
The trends established from these charts will be helpful in analyzing the impact of protests in 
each of the provinces. 
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Figure 2.5: Amount of Sulfur Dioxide per Province, 2004-20155 (N=41)  
                                                        
5 This figure only reports those cases examined in this study 
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Figure 2.4 shows a fairly consistent downward trend of SO2 concentration in each 
provincial capital. Guangzhou, Guangdong has the most significant drop, as it had had one of the 
higher concentrations of SO2 in 2004 to one of lowest of the cases in 2015. Changsha, Hunan 
also shows an impressive dip in concentration, starting at almost 90 micrograms per meter cubed, 
which is significantly higher than the other capitals, and settling around the average volume that 
the other capitals measured in 2015. Nanjing, while having lowered its overall SO2 
concentration throughout the timeline did not experience as significant a decline as the other 
capitals. Moreover, it began as the capital with the lowest SO2 concentration and ended up as the 
capital with the highest volume in 2015. 
 Figure 2.5 shows steady declines of SO2 amounts from 2004 to 2015, as measured in tens 
of thousands of tons. Compared to Figure 2.4, which saw dramatic changes in SO2 volume in 
each capital city, Figure 2.5 does not present many. The position with which each capital started 
in 2004 did not end up shifting significantly up to the timeline’s end in 2015. For example, 
Guangdong, Jiangsu, and Sichuan provinces all began with around 1.2 million tons of SO2, and 
successively ended with around 70 or 80 million tons of SO2. Although Figures 2.4 and 2.5 
cannot be compared extensively due to differing units, one can conclude that SO2 concentrations 
in capital cities and the surrounding provincial area differ in terms of the rate at which SO2 is 
reduced. 
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Fig. 2.6: Chemical Oxygen Demand Discharge per Province, 2004-20156 (N=41) 
 
Sourced from National Bureau of Statistics of China 
(http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/annualdata/) 
 
   
   
  
                                                        
6 This figure only reports those cases examined in this study 
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  Figure 2.6 presents chemical oxygen demand (COD) discharge, and its fluctuating measure 
across the timeline. From 2004 to 2010 (the data of which was taken from a 2005 report and 
2011 report, respectively) demonstrates a very gradual decline. A severe increase takes place in 
2011 (this data was taken from the 2012 report), and again gradually declines until the end of the 
graph. For each region, the amount of COD discharge almost doubles, or in the case of 
Guangdong more than doubles. This reported data is concerning, especially from a validity 
standpoint, however, Statista reports a very similar jump in between 2010 and 2011 (Statista, 
2016). If these statistics are accurate, it would not bode well for protest efficacy. Because of the 
switch in national leadership occurring in 2012 from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping, the reporting 
methods may have changed, or the data collecting methods changed. Regardless, I will examine 
2010-2011 as a separate account in Chapter III, and subsequently 2004-2009 and 2012-2015 as 
separate accounts. 
 
Conclusions 
 The data examined in this chapter shows that protest impact needs to be examined alongside 
national policy implementation in order to gain a clearer picture of how protests can lead to 
decreases in environmental harm. The data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China show 
that air and water pollution have been decreasing in general, both within provinces and in their 
capital cities. Environmental protests are simultaneously increasing. This chapter alone cannot 
demonstrate whether protests have an impact on the decreasing trends shown in the datasets. 
Moreover, it is not sufficient in showing differences between provinces, including coastal and 
continental stratifications. 
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  Chapter III will not only examine implementation of environmental regulations per province, 
but will also draw comparisons with the data presented in this chapter, including whether or not 
regulation enforcement matches up with decreases in pollutants per pollution type. For example, 
if larger amounts of protests occurred toward water pollutants in a certain province, and 
increases in government regulation alongside decreases in water pollutants (primarily COD 
discharge), this would present a convincing argument in favor of protest impact. Specifically in 
reference to air pollution, both figures presenting SO2 concentration showed steady declines 
over time. Paired with government action in response to air pollution protests, this may show a 
promising picture for environmental protest efficacy. However, there are other potential 
influencing factors at play. The growing global effort to combat the adverse costs as seen in the 
21st Conference of Parties could be placing pressure on China to carry out and enforce 
environmental reforms. I do not deny that this is playing a role, but this does not explain why 
localized protests have been able to interrupt factory construction sporadically. If China were 
beginning to curb to international pressure, officials would respond to environmental protests 
with the same vigor they do with other social protests (such as land reclamation or labor 
protests). Chapter III will also examine William Gamson’s social movement theory, especially 
his thoughts on movement impact, in order to see how the government responds to 
environmental complaints in the broader sense. The data in this chapter will be amplified through 
the qualitative analysis offered in the next chapter. 
  
 
39 
 
Chapter III 
Framing Protest Outcomes 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 One of the more complicated puzzles this experiment attempts to unravel is how and why 
Chinese officials react to environmental protests. Chapter II demonstrates that the numbers of 
successful protests are more or less equal with the number of failed protests across a majority of 
the cases, with the exception of Sichuan and Jiangsu (Figure 2.2). The type of protest (air, water, 
or soil) does not have much bearing on its outcome either (Figure 2.3). While these quantitative 
data points are significant in presenting the relative success or failure experienced in each 
province, a qualitative examination of each case is necessary to help determine why each protest 
succeeds or fails, as well as to gain an understanding of what may impact the actual enforcement 
of regulation. These are the primary tasks of Chapter III. 
  Appendix A lists each case of protest analyzed in this experiment. In addition to 
cataloging the case location, type, and its success or failure, it also lists the relative size and the 
rationale for the specified outcome. This chapter will look at relevant factors for the success or 
failure of an instance of protests. Moreover, if protests that consistently failed did so because of 
high amounts of violence, this experiment will also suggest that protestor violence is indicative 
of failure. The following sections of this chapter examine the evolution of environmental 
regulation alongside the growth of environmental protests in China, and finally merge the results 
into a model suggesting patterns of impact in its broadest terms. More specifically, official 
initiatives and policies directed at environmental improvement are examined for similarities with 
the aims of each protest. For example, if paper mills are common targets among cases, and the 
government subsequently releases an initiative that focuses on reducing paper mill construction 
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or even investments in cleaner mill operation, there is a possibility that this was due to the 
presence of a protest.  
Lastly, these figures are examined through the lens of political opportunity in order to 
examine why protests were allowed to operate under normally repressive government officials. 
Each province is analyzed separately, as opposed to grouping them according pollution type. 
 
Chinese Environmental Regulation, 2002-2016 
 Although inklings of environmental activism existed prior to 2002, the PRC ratified the 
protocols to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (often referred to as 
the Kyoto Protocol) in August 2002, which paved the way for increased attention to 
environmental matters within its borders and its involvement in the global shift toward 
conservation (UNFCCC, 2014). The Kyoto Protocol is a United Nations agreement that sets 
carbon reduction targets for each state that commits itself to the language of the document. 
Interestingly, China also joined the World Trade Organization in 2002, hinting at a sense of 
reform throughout China’s central government (Xia et al., 2016). Since 2002, China has 
developed several policy actions and initiatives to combat its worsening physical environment. In 
fact, since 2005 (the year in which the Kyoto Protocol entered into force), the PRC has released a 
major new environmental policy every year, with 2007 serving as the only exception, 
culminating in their ratification of the 21st Conference of the Parties in September 2016.  
In 2003, three policies were enacted concerning environmental protection, namely the 
Cleaner Production Promotion Law, the Environmental Impact Assessment Law, and a policy 
named “On Accelerating the Development of Circular Economy.” The Cleaner Production 
Promotion Law does not target any industry specifically, but encourages several levels of 
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government, most notably local institutions, develop “green” blueprints for industries to follow 
(NPC, 2007). This law is significant as it begins the realization of involving local governments in 
conservation efforts. More pointedly, the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Law paves 
the way for lawful action civilians or other parts of civil society could take against construction 
projects that could potentially result in environmental harm. EIAs require firms to conduct 
impact assessments of the land they plan to build upon, examining wildlife, water resource, and 
soil impact, among other things (Environmental Impact Assessment Law, 2003). This policy also 
requires firms to hold public hearings to gain insight about the potential sensitivity of 
environmental issues in the area (EIA, 2003). 
To investigate further the efficacy of these EIAs, the rest of this section is dedicated to 
explaining the regulations and initiatives relevant to the industrial sector proposed in this 
fourteen-year period. Three subsections are included, focusing on air pollution, water pollution, 
and soil pollution respectively. In each subsection, I discuss major policies promulgated between 
2004 and 2016 with relation to each type of pollution. Each policy is examined for content 
including what type of infrastructure is targeted (directly or indirectly), what the policy is aiming 
to accomplish, and the timeframe for which the policy was debated and finally released. I cross-
reference these policies with the protests outlined in Appendix A to discuss the degree of 
similarity between the policies and protests, primarily with regards to time, the aims of each, and 
the setting with which each took place.  
For example, if there were several protests targeting radioactive waste dumping during a 
two or three-year period, and within that same timeframe, a policy came out that targeted firms 
with records of prolific radioactive waste dumping, it could be said that these protests assisted in 
motivating the government to create policy to combat the environmental offenders. This may 
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also ease the amount of protests. This will assist in assessing how both national and regional 
governments react and adapt to the growing number of protests occurring throughout the 
country, thereby supporting the section of this chapter that employs social movement theories. 
The end of each subsection will conclude with a discussion concerning how impactful each type 
of protest appeared to be with regards to policy implementation. 
 
Air 
 Examining protests alongside policy that relates to air pollution can be difficult, as air 
pollution protests are, by far, the most abundant type. For the first several years of the 2004-2016 
timeline analyzed in this thesis, protests concerning air pollution come out about even with water 
and soil protests. However, beginning around 2010, cases of air pollution protest account for 
almost 75% of the reported cases analyzed in this experiment. I expect to see that policy and 
initiatives concerning air pollution will coalesce around the latter years of this study, however, 
careful observations as to the content of the policies and initiatives alongside the demands of 
protesters are very important for the accurate results. 
The years 2005-2010 saw several policies released having to do with developing 
renewable energy sources and utilizing their contributions for continued economic growth, with 
special attention to combatting air pollution. The National People’s Congress released the 
Renewable Energy Law, the Energy Conservation Law, and the Circular Economy Promotion 
Law within this five-year period (Xia et al., 2016). The texts of these laws suggest incentives for 
particular industries to adopt the measures by targeting certain technologies in each sector. For 
example, the Energy Conservation Law encourages the industrial to use equipment such as 
boilers, furnaces, and motor pumps that use clean coal and other innovative technologies in the 
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industrial sector (Law of the People’s Republic of China on Energy Conservation, 2008). It even 
prohibits the construction of new coal-powered or gasoline-powered forms of energy production. 
Several times, this law mentions the role of coal in the fight to conserve energy, however the law 
points subtly to its harmful role in contributing to China’s air pollution problem. It notes the 
importance of cutting down on the use of motor vehicles and the need to cut down on air 
conditioning in the real estate sector. Both of these are significant factors when considering 
contribution to China’s air pollution, especially as its citizens grow wealthier (Ye, 2015).  
This policy is difficult to compare with the protest data. While it does target air pollution, 
it focuses on topics that are popular subjects of protest such as motor vehicle use and coal-fired 
power plants. Of the 28 cases of air pollution collected in this research, there are only two 
protests that target coal-fired power plant pollution. However, this does not mean that the air 
pollution protests that occurred around 2008 lacked impact on the enforcement of environmental 
regulation. If anything, demonstrations could have shown each respective level of government 
that the people are willing to protest when conditions are worsening. An examination of post-
2010 air pollution protests assists in determining impact around this timeframe. 
Between 2004 and 2010 there were eleven cases of air pollution protest across the five 
provinces surveyed in this study. Of the eleven cases, eight were unsuccessful and three may be 
considered as successful by the standards used in this study. Even in large cities, such as Beijing 
(population: about 22 million) and Guangzhou (population: about 15 million), protesters fail to 
force government implementation of environmentally hazardous infrastructure (Statista, 2018). 
The only successes that occurred in this timeframe did so because the protesters succeeded in 
making the government conduct a more thorough environmental impact assessment (EIA). In 
most cases, this occurred before the construction started, as can be seen in the successful 2010 
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protest in Foshan, Guangdong. This group of cases demonstrates that, regardless of location or 
size of the protest, more legitimate and process-oriented tactics, such as calling for another EIA, 
are more effective. 
 China’s Eleventh Five-Year plan (2006-2010) also saw a handful of environmental 
polices focused on air pollution, including concentrations of sulfur dioxide in the atmosphere. 
The plan aims specifically at shutting down highly inefficient power plants and installing 
“desulfurization” equipment on several coal-powered plants (Cao et al. 2009). As far as this 
regulation goes, coal is the primary target once again. However, upon examination of the cases, 
most protests were in opposition to the construction of plants or garbage incinerators. Very few 
were actually in regards to existing infrastructure. Approximately 25% of air pollution protests 
targeted sites where a factory or garbage incinerator had already been built. This suggests that 
protests break out more often due to announced plans rather than buildings already present. 
 The Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) continues to outline measures to decrease sulfur 
dioxide emissions, including the continuation of goals from the previous Five-Year Plan. 
However, this plan emphasizes the need to build clean and technologically efficient waste 
disposal facilities, including clean incinerators, a measure that did not receive much attention in 
the previous five years (National 12th Five-Year Plan for Environmental Protection, 2011). This 
likely highlights that government officials realized the issues inefficient garbage incinerators 
pose, as well as the protests their construction caused. Up until 2011, nine of the eleven cases of 
air pollution protests reported garbage incinerators as the target of their ire. The ensuing years, 
following the Twelfth Five-Year Plan, saw a decline in the amount of garbage incineration 
protests. Only six out of the fifteen air pollution protests contested garbage incinerators, and five 
out of those six cases took place in Guangdong. The magnitude of garbage incinerator protests, 
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by far the most prevalent type of protest reported in the selection of cases used in this 
experiment, lessened significantly following the establishment of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan. 
 
Water 
Between 2008 and 2014, two major policies were released with regards to water 
pollution. The 2008 Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law is a fairly comprehensive 
policy that targets urban and rural settings alike, as well as industrial and shipping-related forms 
of water contamination. Interestingly, the majority of protests in this study regarding water 
pollution occurred in 2008 and before as indicated in Appendix A. This comprehensive water 
pollution policy could have been in response to the plurality of water pollution cases occurring 
between 2004 and 2008, where almost half targeted water contamination of some sort. In 2014, 
the State Council released a policy titled “Regulation of Urban Drainage and Sewage Treatment” 
that describes methods concerning how drainage facilities should be built, and how the resulting 
water should be directed, whether through wastewater plants or rainwater lines (Regulation on 
Urban Drainage and Sewage Treatment, 2013). The text of this policy speaks mostly to the urban 
populace. Case 24 from Appendix A points to a relatively well-known case of protest in Jiangsu 
province in 2012, targeting a wastewater discharge system within a Japanese-owned paper mill. 
While this is two years behind the advent of the Urban Drainage law, the magnitude of people 
present at the site of the protest (numbered in the thousands), alongside its location in a coastal 
province, could have made a big enough impact at the national level to merit a new, national 
policy. Moreover, the creation of the Ten-Point Water Plan of 2015 aims at further curbing water 
pollution, improving technological standards, and encouraging public participation as its primary 
targets. However, this plan appears to disregard rural settings altogether. The policy aims at 
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specifically improving the cleanliness of “urban drinking water” and to “improve the 
environmental quality of coastal areas” (China Water Risk, 2015). Moreover, a significant 
portion of the text refers directly to improve the “urban water environment” in Beijing, Tianjin, 
Hebei, the Pearl River Delta and the Yangtze River Delta (China Water Risk). This plan does 
refer to increasing the efficiency of water used for agricultural purposes, though, unlike the key 
urban areas specifically mentioned, rural areas receive no direct statement. 
The success of these three water pollution policies can be seen in the decline of cases of 
protests. In my experiment most of the cases concerning water pollution occurred in 2008 and 
before. After 2008, there were only two cases of protest in all five provinces. This can be 
attributed in part to the success of national policy and also the size of participation in the 
protests. The first case of water pollution protest in this study occurred in Sichuan in 2004, with 
reported numbers of at least 100,000 people. Protests of this category arising afterwards never 
had less than several hundreds of participants. Considering the drop in reported water pollution 
protests during the latter half of the timeline, these types of protests may have decreased 
altogether. Moreover, besides their jump in 2011, COD levels saw steady decreases every year in 
each province. The presence of policy, such as the three described above, discourages firms from 
contaminating water sources with waste or chemicals. With policy release occurring around the 
same time as nationally significant protests, civilian impact on creation of this policy can be 
ascertained. 
The aforementioned Twelfth Five-Year plan mentioned water pollution more often than 
not, which is significant given the lack of attention given to it in previous plans. Within the “Key 
Projects” portion of the Plan, the first two points discussed directly relate to China’s proposals to 
combat water contamination, specifically in river basins and sources of drinking water (12th plan 
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source). This is significant because, leading up to the advent of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan, the 
only instances of reported water pollution protest throughout the entire timeline occurred before 
2010. Every instance of protest in this experiment, save for one, took place to rally against a firm 
found guilty of contaminating drinking water sources. 
 
Soil 
 Taking into consideration all of China’s environmental policy throughout nearly the first 
one and a half decades of the 21st century, soil pollution regulation seems to be the least covered. 
Of all the key policies discussed in Qiong Xia’s research paper on Chinese environmental policy 
efficacy, only one regulation addresses the issue of soil pollution. The “Solid Waste Pollution 
Prevention and Control Law” sought to control and gain an accurate image as to the amounts of 
solid waste present in each province, and put in place alternatives to dumping and using 
environmentally harmful materials in industry. However, throughout the selection of reported 
protests gathered for this study, none of the protests occurred to object solid waste pile-up; most 
concerned radiation from nuclear waste, with others relating to mining contamination or oil 
buildup.  
 Each of the Five-Year plans addresses soil pollution to some degree, indicating its 
probable unimportance at the national level. The Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006-2010) once 
again addresses the threats posed to the environment from the large amounts of solid waste. The 
Twelfth Five-Year Plan does address other forms of soil pollution, namely remediating 
previously contaminated plots of land and taking steps to ensure the proper disposal of nuclear 
waste to prevent soil radiation poisoning. So while the aims of protests were discussed within the 
Five-Year plans, it is difficult to establish direct impact due to the relative imprecision with 
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which soil pollution is addressed at the national level. Moreover, instances of soil pollution 
protest from 2004 to 2016 seem scattered and do not generally follow as precise a pattern as air 
pollution and water pollution protests do, per release of environmental regulation. Therefore, soil 
pollution cases are used more to determine how protests operate in China in the following 
section, and will have less to do with their impact on regulation enforcement. 
  
 Applying William Gamson’s Social Movement Theory 
 William Gamson reminds us that social movement success is better thought of “as a set 
of outcomes” rather than using a black or white approach (Gamson, 414). In a unified social 
movement, these outcomes can come in the form government concessions (or a lack thereof), the 
achievements of the movement leader and their subsequent treatment of the supposed 
beneficiaries, among other things (414). Even though China’s blooming environmental activism 
has not yet reached social movement status, many of the same techniques Gamson uses to 
identify movement success can be attributed to the set of protests in this experiment. He divides 
his concepts into two components, namely “new advantages” and “acceptance” (414). Whereas 
“new advantages” refers to benefits members of the social movement gain, “acceptance” 
signifies how the supposedly ruling opposition recognizes the movement’s ideals and demands.  
 Figure 3.1 “Challenged Outcome Framework” 
  Official Acceptance  
New  Full None 
Advantages Full Full Response Preemption 
 None Co-optation Failure 
 
Source: Gamson, William A. 2009. “Defining Movement Success.” In The Social 
Movements Reader, edited by Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper, pp. 414-416. West Sussex: 
Wiley-Blackwell Publishing. 
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Framing this table within the bounds of the scattered Chinese environmental protests 
requires nothing more than examining each protest separately. Each of the outcomes, save for 
“collapse,” applies to a subsequent outcome a group of protesters achieved or did not achieve. A 
protest does not “collapse” in the traditional sense; the unification factor inherent to a social 
movement does not endure in a group of protesters. Once a protest ends in these cases, regardless 
of the outcome, it ends. There were not any regrouping efforts, save for one case (the Lake Taihu 
protests persisted over multiple years). What Gamson denotes as “collapse” will be referred to 
throughout as “failure.”  
 The protest outcomes are decided by whether or not the incident succeeded in obtaining 
new advantages, such as plant closure or plant movement for example, or if the authorities 
“accepted” the demands of the protesters, which is drawn from the government’s response to the 
protests. Successful outcomes fall under the category of “full response,” when both new 
advantages and acceptances are achieved, and “co-optation,” when groups obtain government 
acceptance but lack in terms of benefits received. Co-optation normally occurs when 
environmentally detrimental projects are temporarily shut down and re-examined through further 
environmental impact assessments. This is considered successful because the protest, while it did 
not achieve plant closures or the like, authorities listened to the complaints and committed to 
multi-year closures to enhance environmental safety. In the meantime, any suffering induced 
through pollution is also suspended. While this outcome is certainly beneficial to some extent, 
advantages are harder to ascertain. In some cases, plants or factories that were ordered to 
suspend or shut down operations continued to operate without penalty (Cindy, 2017). On these 
occasions, it is difficult to tell what role the authorities played in the plants’ continued operation, 
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and whether or not government officials only appeared accepting of the protesters’ demands.  
For this reason, these cases fall under “co-optation.” 
Failed outcomes happen as a result of denied acceptance and advantages. Pre-emption, 
which this experiment frames as failure, occurs when protesters receive benefits, such as the 
relocation of a plant or factory, but do not achieve much in the form of government acceptance 
or regulation enforcement. For most protests, officials preempted the incident in order to quell a 
protest that gained too much traction. Instead of suffering profit loss and public instability, 
officials moved construction sites. This outcome demonstrates circumstances in which 
environmental regulation is not enforced and the public’s desire for a cleaner environment is 
moved out of sight. The following paragraphs address these outcomes, according to each 
province, and further stratified into their respective coastal and continental divides. These 
outcomes will also address the patterns of national policy noted earlier in this chapter, and finally 
the data trends from graphs in Chapter II. 
 
Hunan and Sichuan: The Continental Provinces 
 Protests taking place in Hunan province present a curious story, as the first several 
protests throughout the timeline rallied against water polluting infrastructure. Even those cases 
with complaints pertaining to soil pollution deliberated the consequences the pollutants would 
have on groundwater. Another interesting trend common among most of the Hunan cases is that 
protesters were alerted to pollutants long after construction was completed or pollution had 
damaged their communities. The first five of the seven cases revealed this trend. For example, 
the 2009 cases in Liuyang and Wugang, while successful, were sparked after autopsies revealed 
copious amounts of cadmium or manganese (from mining operations) in people who had died 
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near each respective factory or plant. These autopsies sparked protests among communities 
surrounding the offending operations, demonstrating that the protesters were unaware of the 
effect mining or plant operations had on their population until after the fact. 
 Interestingly, the final two reported protests in Hunan, occurring in 2014 and 2016, 
gathered in response to announced plans to construct factories, which, in the eyes of the 
protesters, could have had a negative impact on air quality. This juxtaposes the standard for a 
protest’s occurrence in Hunan: the participants knew of the potential consequences of each 
factory’s operation. That this occurred toward the latter end of the experiment’s timeline is 
curious; it indicates that citizens of Hunan were becoming more aware of the environmental 
harm that industrial growth posed. Whereas before, protest participants objected to already 
operating factories or polluting infrastructure, more recent protests oppose these before they are 
built. 
 Pollution type did not seem to have any bearing on the direction a protest took. Instead, 
the result of the protest presents a more compelling story. After applying Gamson’s framework, 
five out of seven of the cases fell under the category of “new advantages.” Although two of those 
five cases did not achieve any tangible form of official acceptance, it shows that the Hunan 
provincial government was more interested in cooperating with the protesters in order to restore 
public stability. The cases that achieved “preemption,” meaning officials did not accept the 
rhetoric of the protest and instead relocated the plant or factory, demonstrate that even if the 
local government appears to agree with the protest, they are uninterested in enforcing 
environmental regulation. The same can be ascertained for the protests that completely failed. It 
was not until the 2016 case in Nan that officials began revealing their intentions to consult with 
the public concerning the construction of any more plants, factories, or incinerators. More 
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specifically, officials stated they would “cease all work related to the project and not start up 
again without public support” (Associated Press, 2016). 
 Sichuan’s cases are no more promising. Of the eight cases throughout the timeline, six of 
them ended in failure, one ended in co-optation, and one protest turned up as a full response. 
What is unique about the Sichuan cases is that all of the failed cases under review were 
unsuccessful because police forces dispersed participants, or put up blockades or increased 
presence to deter protests from occurring. In a few cases, such as in Pengzhou and Chengdu, 
police detected plans before the incident could take place. Two of the eight protests were 
quashed once local authorities picked up on their activity. Another common trend among 
Sichuan’s reported protests showed strong government presence and support for the individual 
projects. The support can be seen in the result of each project; their responses to protests were 
normally forceful, and three of the eight cases had instances of bullying and violence to disperse 
protesters. 
 The abnormal amount of failures (compared to successes) in Sichuan’s case begs the 
question as to why there was little achievement when protests did occur. Other than substantial 
government involvement in the projects, reports of each incident focused also on the presence of 
police, and their subsequent reactions, at each protests’ site. It seems that authorities play a more 
enforcing role in Sichuan than in other provinces. All of the failures can be attributed to police 
involvement, rather than on the tactics or methods of the protesters, all of which managed similar 
approaches when compared to other protests’ operations. Moreover, protests appeared to persist 
in Pengzhou, an area outside of Chengdu, where government interests and citizen unrest collided 
on three separate occasions, with regards to three individual chemical plants. All three of these 
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cases of protest, which took place at the sites of the chemical plants and even outside 
government offices located in Chengdu, ended in failure.  
 The two cases that did not end in breakdown ended in ways consistent with successes 
across the other provinces in this experiment. The 2008 Gaodong protest ended in co-optation 
when citizens of Gaodong spoke out against a manganese smelter that contaminated their water 
source. As in Hunan, the local government understood their pleas. Unlike Hunan, even with 
national attention given to the case, nothing was done about the manganese mining operation and 
protesters were bullied into submission. Although the residents of Gaodong did not receive any 
“new advantages,” each respective form of government “accepted” at face the residents’ wishes. 
This can be seen in the next case at Shifang in 2012, which coincidentally was the only other 
case of mining protest, which subsequently ended in success, or “full response.” The plans to 
build the smelter were cancelled.  
 
Jiangsu and Guangdong: The Coastal Provinces 
 Among the cases reviewed in this experiment, Jiangsu appears unique in that it was the 
only province that did not see any failed protests. Three of the five cases came up under full 
response, while the other two saw co-optation due to factory or plant suspension instead of 
closure. Interestingly enough, Jiangsu protests were also the smallest in terms of a protest’s 
participants. Most cases numbered only in the hundreds. Moreover, Jiangsu’s protests were the 
least violent and destructive out of all the provinces. Only one of the five protests, which was 
also one of the biggest, resorted to violence, whereas other provinces had at least three protests 
where groups of protesters became destructive. There is not anything to indicate why this might 
be the case, except that perhaps due to the small number of cases across Jiangsu there is less of a 
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sample to identify violent cases. Violent protests are harder to understand in terms of their 
reporting, as it would make sense that the more disruptive a protest, the more likely it is that it 
would get news coverage. However, it would also make sense due to the CCP’s strict control 
over the media that protests that defied authorities and caused mass disruption would not find 
much, if any, coverage. 
 Interestingly, Jiangsu displayed a pattern running in reverse compared to Hunan and 
Sichuan. The first three protests received full response, meaning authorities conceded to a 
protest’s demands and accepted their aims. The last two protests, occurring in 2016, fell into the 
co-optation category, in that authorities suspended the operations of the plants instead of shutting 
them down entirely. Keeping in mind the general trend China is displaying with regards to 
decreases in harmful pollutants, this pattern is surprisingly contrasting, especially considering 
Jiangsu’s location near the coast and proximity to Shanghai. The graphs in Figures 2.4 and 2.5 
confirm this. Although Jiangsu began with promising amounts of emissions (In 2004, Nanjing 
had the lowest concentration of sulfur dioxide out of the five provincial capitals), it ended in 
2016 with the highest concentrations of sulfur dioxide across the province, even in Nanjing.  
 Despite this concerning recent trend toward co-optation, Jiangsu’s cases all demonstrate 
government willingness to accept the environmental ideology the public presents. Even if 
operations were not completely shut down, every protest had some benefit in terms of the local 
government’s ability to respond to grievances, which cannot be said for any of the other 
provinces. Although the direction of Jiangsu’s ability to properly implement environmental 
regulation is shaky, the face of the issue is such that the government is properly enforcing 
regulation at the present time.  
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 Guangdong had the most cases of reported protests, with seventeen cases between 2004 
and 2016, compared to the next highest province, Sichuan, which had only eight. This could 
provide the experiment with a more clear and careful analysis of Guangdong’s protest efficacy 
and ability to influence regulation enforcement. However, there are not any clear patterns from 
the existing stratifications I set for the experiment. For example, successes and failures did not 
lean toward one side of the timeline. In fact, there were just as many “full responses” as there 
were “failures.” In order to try and ascertain a clearer pattern, I isolated all the cases that 
protested the construction or operation of garbage incinerators, of which there were ten. I came 
up with the same results; there were just as many successes as there were failures. Next, I broke 
up Guangdong into regions (north, south, east, and west) to try and ascertain if one part of the 
province had more successes or failures than others. I was not able to pull any patterns from this 
breakdown either. Protests with instances of violence or higher than average participant 
magnitude did not present any relevant findings. 
 Lastly, I inspected the reasons for the outcome of each of the seventeen protests. 
Fortunately, I found a general pattern. Of the successful cases, in which were six “full responses” 
and three “co-optations,” five were successful because government officials wanted to restore 
social stability and four because proper environmental risk assessments had not been carried out. 
The two cases that fell under the category of “preemption,” while they only succeeded in 
relocating a proposed construction site were also done in order to restore public stability. The 
reaction to the plurality of Guangdong cases occurred with regards to combatting social unrest. 
In terms of the case failures, of which there were six, four protests were not successful because 
construction had already started. This seems to be a trend common among failures across all five 
provinces. The other two failures in Guangdong were a result of coal-fired power plants already 
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in operation, which authorities permitted to run despite the harm it imposed upon the 
environment and public health. 
 Another peculiar aspect of the Guangdong cases is the abundance of air pollution 
protests. While most forms of protests in each province amounted to air pollution, other than 
Jiangsu, other forms of protests normally fell one or two cases under the number of air pollution 
protests. Out of Guangdong’s seventeen cases, thirteen considered air pollution. There were only 
three cases of the next highest form (soil pollution). Taking into account Guangdong’s massive 
population, this makes sense. In 2016, Guangdong contained nearly 110 million people (Statista, 
2016). Paired with Guangdong’s booming economy (the highest in terms of gross regional 
product in 2016), this province has the potential to produce a lot of waste, as seen in the 
abundance of garbage incinerator protests. Unfortunately there were more failures than 
successes, though only by one case. It appears as though Guangdong authorities are not willing 
to sacrifice their economic prowess in exchange for environmental restoration. However, based 
upon the outcomes discussed in the previous paragraph, Guangdong is primarily concerned with 
preserving public stability. 
  
Beijing 
Out of Beijing’s four cases, only one of them succeeded. Reported protests in Beijing 
only occurred from 2006 to 2012 too, demonstrating the tight timeframe and amount of content 
with which the experiment can operate. Through the combined efforts of data provided through 
the EJ Atlas and Thomas Johnson’s examination of garbage incinerators in Beijing, a more 
comprehensive picture can be established despite the small amount of cases. 
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 Three of the four Beijing cases unfolded in very similar ways. Not only did they all target 
waste incinerators, the tactics the protesters used, such as petitions and public forums, were 
present among the three cases as well. The issues all stemmed from the fact that local authorities 
did not properly consult or notify residents within the affected area. The 2009 case in the 
Changping district demonstrates this issue. When the construction of the waste incinerator was 
about to begin, notice was given through the distribution of only three written posters posted in 
public areas (Johnson, 2013). In a district with well over half of a million people, this is not 
sufficient (World Population Review, 2018). A photo of the notice was passed around, and the 
protests ensued. Similar tactics occurred across the rest of the protests, including some 
coordination with SEPA (Johnson, 2013). 
Despite these efforts, only the 2006 Liulitun protest succeeded (though it was not until 
2011 that officials announced the closure of the waste incinerator). As Johnson notes, this case 
most likely succeeded due to the area’s middle to upper class society, which normally have the 
capability to form knowledgeable and extensive anti-incinerator networks with local NGOs. 
Lower class districts, such as those in Gaoantun and Asuwei, do not have the means to resist 
with the methods seen in upper class communities and are “more easily placated through 
compensation and therefore less likely to oppose an incinerator” (Johnson, 125). Although 
Beijing provided the least number of reported protests, the outcomes of each isolated protest help 
provide insight as to the impact other communities across China may have on regulation 
enforcement. 
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Figure 3.2: Summary of Sample Outcomes 
 
 Full Response 
(new 
advantages 
and official 
acceptance) 
Co-optation 
(No new 
advantages, 
but official 
acceptance) 
Preemption 
(New 
advantages, 
but no official 
acceptance) 
Failure  
(no new 
advantages 
and no 
official 
acceptance) 
Timeline 
Protests 
Occurred 
Beijing 1 0 0 3 2006-2012 
Guangdong 6 3 2 6 2005-2016 
Hunan 3 0 2 2 2004-2016 
Jiangsu 3 2 0 0 2007-2016 
Sichuan 1 0 0 7 2004-2015 
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Conclusions 
 Each province in this experiment has its own story to tell, and has dealt with the 
progression of national environmental regulation differently. While united in their aims to 
subvert the harmful effects of pollution in their communities, every community has had to adapt 
to the politics of their region, whether through petitions and extensive government networks or 
mass, violent upheavals. Alongside the data from Chapter II, the first part of this chapter shows 
how, at least at the national level, categories of protests and national policy coexist. As public 
concern over a particular ecological sorting, so too did national concern. The same cannot be 
said at the provincial level. 
 Upon categorizing each protest according to their outcomes, this experiment can gain a 
more precise picture as to why protests were succeeding or failing in their communities, and then 
over the province as a whole. The continental cases in Sichuan and Hunan appear to confirm 
Johnson’s reasoning from his study in Beijing; lower class communities bear the brunt of the 
worst environmental offenses. In Hunan, even though there were almost as many successes as 
failures, many citizens were unaware of the environmental hazards posed by factories or plants 
until severe sickness and even death plagued their communities. Upon protesting, the public 
normally achieved at worst the movement of the offending infrastructure, and at best a complete 
closure. Among these successes, local authorities came through with further enforcement, 
compelling industries to conduct more thorough risk assessments and submissions of inspected 
water quality reports. In Sichuan, the abundance of unsuccessful protests speaks to the hard 
stance officials take toward environmental activism. 
 Cases occurring in the coastal provinces and Beijing establish that, even in failure, the 
public is advancing their efforts to raise environmental awareness in these regions. Jiangsu’s 
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complete lack of failure shows the government’s willingness to take into account public concern 
with regards to new construction projects. In doing so, authorities can avoid the troubling 
presence of activism while maintaining higher environmental standards. In Guangdong, though 
numbers of failures were still relatively high, concern for social stability revealed to the public 
that large and policy-centered protests could provide new advantages. However, due to 
Guangdong’s population and economic prestige, public voice was often squandered in favor of 
much-needed waste incinerators. Most importantly, this chapter was able to shape a clearer 
image as to why and how Chinese officials respond to environmental protests. As social actors 
improve their tactical ability to shape this enforcement, whether through networking or massive, 
upsetting demonstrations, officials will have to commit to a frame with which to propel the 
identity of the PRC. 
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Chapter IV 
Muddying the Water: The Future of Environmental Activism 
 
  
Introduction 
The story of environmental contention in China can be gleaned, at least partly, from the 
statistics and cases presented in these chapters and the forty-one cases in Appendix A. 
Environmental activism is scattered, localized, and its width reaches barely beyond provincial 
borders. Response from the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) national body toward this 
activism is scarce. Even at the local levels, officials’ reactions do not often promise success or 
public improvement concerning the protests in this thesis. Only about one out of every three 
cases examined in this study ended in favor of the protesters’ demands, with well over half of 
those successes confined to coastal regions. To the international community, the CCP may seem 
environmentally active, and even proactive, considering Li Keqiang’s 2014 “war on pollution,” 
in addition to their ratification of the 21st Conference of Parties (also known as the Paris 
Agreement) in 2016. With the United States’ departure from the Paris Agreement, several news 
reports indicate the possibility of China’s rise to the global environmental stage (Hilton, 2016; 
Seligmann, 2018; Zhang, 2017). While at face value, China’s potential as a leader in climate 
change may seem plausible, their response to domestic incidents and severely delayed reactions 
to environmental hazards demonstrates that China must practice more enforcement and public 
consultation than the sample examined in this study has shown. 
China’s more recent environmental activity, from a national perspective, shows that the 
CCP has “rebranded itself as the global steward of green initiatives” (Zhang, 2017). One of 
China’s primary initiatives revolves around the construction of renewable energy sources 
(mainly solar, water, and wind) to replace coal-fired power plants across the country. According 
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to China’s National Energy Administration and the China Electricity Council, renewable energy 
infrastructure accounts for about 70% of the “new capacity added” for energy sources in the first 
half of 2017 (Mathews, 2017). However, this does not mean that China is slowing its overall 
demand for energy produced from coal. China continues to export its coal-energy production to 
other countries, through the construction of Chinese-owned factories in foreign lands, in order to 
maintain the power needs of their own population (Institute for Energy Research, 2017). While 
China’s global coal production networks lie outside the bounds of this study, it demonstrates the 
insidious costs with which their “global environmental leadership” is achieved. While the 
country appears to be pushing ahead as a whole, the marginalized appear to bear the burdens of 
development. The results of this study validate this attitude to some extent. 
In order to glean a clearer picture of the present domestic environmental situation in 
China, revisiting the past three years of environmental activism is helpful. The following section 
will reintroduce the results from 2014-2016 protests from this study. This will determine the 
relative success or failure recent protests have experienced. In 2014, my sample included four 
reported protests in two provinces: Hunan and Guangdong. This year is helpful in that there is 
representation from both continental and coastal China. Hunan experienced two failures and 
Guangdong two relative successes (the plants’ construction were delayed). Three of the four 
cases took issue with plant construction. In 2015, there were also four reported protests: three in 
Guangdong and one in Sichuan. Only one of these protests succeeded (case 33); curiously, this 
case was the only one in which the protest took issue with plant construction. The other three 
protested plants that were already operating. These three protests subsequently failed. 
In my sample, there were five protests in 2016: two in Jiangsu, one in Sichuan, one in 
Hunan, and one in Guangdong. The two failed protests in 2016 occurred in Guangdong and 
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Sichuan. The Guangdong failure was a fairly standard case; officials announced that the garbage 
incinerator met all of the official guidelines for operation, and no further action was needed. The 
Sichuan failure was also standard for the cases in the continental provinces examined in this 
study; officials appeared more interested in maintaining social stability than giving in to public 
demands. The three successes (two in Jiangsu and one in Hunan), achieved suspension of their 
respective targets, falling under the category of “co-optation.” 
When compared to the protests included in the 2004-2013 timeline, there is not much 
differentiation. Several protests throughout this timeline ended in success due to protests 
surrounding the construction of plants or factories, rather than incidents over those already 
existing. A successful outcome is likely where pre-existing infrastructure is concerned. 
Moreover, several protests (both successes and failures) ended where the restoration of social 
stability as a priority over the issues the public held.  
Due to the variation in outcomes, especially when examined province to province, it is 
difficult to state definitively that China’s environmental activism has evolved into a full-fledged 
social movement. This is not entirely surprising, as social movements are incredibly difficult to 
create and sustain in China. Not only are they illegal, the components typical of a social 
movement can be impossible to meet (Qi, 2017). For example, “workers are not allowed to form 
unions independent from the state…” which highlights the inability of public organizations to 
engage in any sort of collective movement against the state, such as a labor strike (Qi, 115). It 
inhibits the ability of individuals to form a collective identity. In terms of environmental 
activism, public groups such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) cannot form outside of 
the auspices of the state either. New environmental activism is limited to the isolated protests 
examined in this study. This was the reason behind the coastal and continental stratifications 
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observed. Due to the significant variation in protest tactics and outcomes, as well as increasingly 
strict restrictions and rules, the CCP has been able to avoid an environmental social movement. 
Unlike the differentiation in protest tactics, official responses across the selected provinces have 
been fairly similar. I would posit that this is a primary reason behind the lack of a unified social 
movement. So long as the CCP continues to make concessions in the face of environmental 
protests, protesters will be content (in the instance of successes) with plant closures, as opposed 
to reaching out beyond their communities to form networks for more environmental activity. 
The rest of this chapter will focus primarily on the examination of the hypotheses 
presented in the first chapter. For each hypothesis, I will use the quantitative data from Chapter II 
and the qualitative data from Chapter III to determine their results. Keeping in mind that the case 
selection is limited to only the five provinces used in this experiment, these results do not reflect 
the country as a whole, rather just those five provinces. However, it is my hope that these 
provinces are the most representative of environmental protests across China, and therefore 
inferences can be made as to environmental regulation enforcement across the whole country. 
With that in mind, I will again present each hypothesis and their individual analyses.  
 
Hypothesis Examination 
Hypothesis #1: As protests increase in coastal areas, environmental regulation will also 
increase. 
 
 Using Jiangsu and Guangdong as representative cases of coastal provinces with booming 
economies, I expected to find that as protests rose in these areas, that regulation would also rise 
due to the nature of the tactics activists used during each episode. These provinces, due to the 
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combined forces of high population (almost 80 million in Jiangsu and 110 million in 
Guangdong) and high levels of economic activity (Jiangsu had a gross regional product (GRP) of 
85,900.94 hundred million yuan in 2016 and Guangdong had a GRP of 89,879.23 million yuan), 
would have a higher chance of success (Statista, 2018; NBS, 2017). With higher populations, I 
forecasted that these cases would contain more people, and it would therefore be more 
challenging for officials to disperse crowds and end the incidents as they occurred. With higher 
levels of economic activity, I expected that higher levels of education and an abundance of 
polluting plants and factories would spark higher numbers of organized and cohesive protests 
than would be found in continental provinces. In order to maintain stability in these provinces, 
government officials would be forced to implement environmental regulation, or face the specter 
of a growing social movement. 
 At the surface level, this hypothesis is supported from the data presented in Chapter II 
and in Appendix A. In Jiangsu and Guangdong, levels of SO2 and COD both decreased over 
time. This does not indicate protests’ impact, but rather it shows that Guangdong and Jiangsu’s 
governments produced reports demonstrating a downward trend for each type of emission. For 
Jiangsu, levels of COD proved the most development out of any of the provinces. Its successes in 
two cases of water pollution and two soil pollution protests exhibit that official enforcement of 
those pollutants in particular are higher than its enforcement concerning air pollution, for which 
Jiangsu showed the least improvement. Moreover, a clear majority of Jiangsu’s reported cases 
occurred after 2011, demonstrating increases in their frequency. 
 Protests in Guangdong also increased in capacity, although a year earlier. Having thirteen 
cases of air pollution protest, it should be easiest to ascertain if protests have an impact on 
regulation enforcement by examining air pollution data in Guangdong. SO2 levels in 
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Guangdong’s capital, Guangzhou, showed the most improvement throughout the timeline. 
Overall, Guangdong province had the highest decrease (almost a decrease of sixty cubic meters 
of SO2 from 2005 to 2016), alongside Hunan, of SO2 volume out of all the provinces. The high 
number of air pollution protests in Guangdong (there are thirteen protests in this study) compared 
to reported improvement in their emission reductions is very notable. In fact, six out of the nine 
Guangdong successes in my study were air pollution protests. Most of those successes may be 
viewed as “full responses” instead of “co-optation,” indicating the efficacy of their protests. 
 In this study, the coastal provinces demonstrated the most success overall. Both 
Guangdong and Jiangsu achieved more successful protests than failed protests, and among those 
successes reached both “new advantages” and “acceptance” in a majority of them. Moreover, the 
most popular type of protest in each province received the most attention in terms of emission 
reduction. In Jiangsu, large reductions in COD levels correlated with tremendous successes in 
water and groundwater pollution protests. Jiangsu had one case of air pollution protest 
throughout this study’s timeline, and subsequently did not see much improvement in SO2 
emissions. While causality cannot be confirmed solely from this linkage, I would argue that the 
protest’s impact is partially revealed here. In Guangdong, the sizable amount of air pollution 
protests correlated with the highest reductions in SO2 emissions out of all the examined 
provinces. The higher the protest’s success in these areas per type of pollution, the higher the 
pollutant reductions are, which therefore indicates higher levels of regulation enforcement. 
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Hypothesis #2: As protests increase in rural areas, environmental regulation enforcement will 
not change. 
  
I chose Hunan and Sichuan as representative cases of the continental regions of China 
due to their significant populations and the higher frequency of protests when compared to other 
continental provinces. I posited that as environmental protests frequency rise among these 
provinces that environmental regulation enforcement would remain unchanged because of the 
smaller economies inherent in western provinces and lower levels of education, specifically 
concerning environmentally hazardous industries. Access to the Internet is significantly lower in 
these provinces than in the coastal provinces, and can further impact access to news of prolific 
environmental harm (Statista, 2016). In 2016, Hunan had a GRP of 34,590.56 hundred million 
yuan and Sichuan had a GRP of 36,980.22 hundred million yuan (NBS, 2017) Due to Internet 
availability and their smaller economies, I expected that Sichuan and Hunan would achieve little 
success in their cases and have little to no impact on environmental regulation enforcement. In 
addition, if these provinces’ governments achieved reduction in emissions, which they did, it 
would not have much to do with environmental activism. 
 The results of this study do not support this hypothesis. Declines in emissions, with 
regards to both SO2 and COD, are apparent. Sichuan actually achieved one of the highest overall 
reductions in SO2 (almost a 50 cubic meter decrease), alongside Guangdong. It is difficult to 
explain this in connection to cases of protest, as Sichuan experienced high levels of failure 
throughout the timeline. Out of the eight reported protests, there is only one success. Unique to 
Sichuan, for the most part, was the amount of preemptive activity on part of the authorities as 
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protests began to develop. Several cases exhibited how police cracked down on protests before 
they even really began, or even the rapidity with which protests were dispersed. 
 Hunan presented decreasing levels of SO2 and COD as well, and showcased another 
relatively unique characteristic among protests as noted before: most demonstrators gathered to 
protest an operation already functioning, as opposed to plans to construct a plant or factory with 
the potential to pollute. Despite the relative lack of success protesters experienced when speaking 
out against existing infrastructure, Hunan protesters were successful in shutting down polluting 
operations in half of the cases dealing with operating plants and factories (in this instance, over a 
smelter and a chemical plant). Hunan’s activists, for a majority of the timeline under 
examination, seemed unaware of the detriments mining operations or chemical plants caused. 
This was evident in the protests’ approach, which normally did not begin until people began to 
die and children fell severely ill. For example, Case 2 in Shutangshan occurred after the loss of 
several forms of livestock, including cows, chickens, bees, and fish, and as villagers began to 
pass away from various forms of cancer. It was not until after an investigation published a report 
of harmful emissions emitted from a local factory that protests started to gather momentum, 
including several attempts to shut off the factory’s electricity (Temper et al., 2015). Sickness and 
fatalities added legitimate cause for the eventual closure of those operations in Hunan. The 
Shutangshan case, while it did not succeed according to the guidelines of this experiment, did 
succeed in moving the factory to another part of China. 
 A more apt conclusion regarding the continental provinces would consider that as 
environmental protests increased, officials and authorities did not show increases in levels of 
concession. Most often in Sichuan’s cases, officials learned and perfected ways to stifle protests, 
as can be seen in the eventual preemptive dispersion of protests before they began (see Cases 27 
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and 37 in Appendix A). In Hunan, it appeared as if one of the only ways to achieve success was 
to connect a factory’s existence with sickness and death (see Cases 2, 4, 14, 15, and 29). The 
continental provinces showed the least possible impact on environmental enforcement. 
 
Hypothesis #3: As protests concerning air pollution increase, overall environmental regulation 
across the provinces selected will increase 
 
 Air pollution protests had the most reported cases among the three pollution types. 
Therefore, it seemed appropriate to examine if the most popular form of protest made the most 
impact on decisions to enforce environmental policy. To recount, air pollution protests counted 
for 61% of the all the cases in this experiment, and 67% of those protests did not result in 
success. One quarter of those unsuccessful protests ended with a preemptive response (due to the 
relocation of a proposed plant, factory, or operation), with the rest ending in complete failure. 
Air pollution protests also increased throughout time. As referenced in Appendix A, from 2004 
to 2009 there were seven cases of reported air pollution protest among the five provinces. From 
2010-2016, there were eighteen reported cases. I hypothesized that due to this increase in 
protests that air pollution regulation enforcement would also increase. 
 It is relatively simple to demonstrate a correlation. Per the SO2 data presented in Chapter 
II, emissions generally decrease year to year as air pollution protests increase across the 
provinces in this study. Along these same lines, instances of air pollution protest success also 
increased over time. Whereas pre-2010 results saw only one successful protest (14% of air 
pollution protests were successful), post-2010 results saw seven (39% of air pollution protests 
were successful). These numbers show plainly that increases in successful and unsuccessful air 
pollution protests coincide with provincial improvements in air and water quality. Additionally, 
as Chapter III notes, increasing attention is paid to waste incinerators and SO2-emmitting 
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infrastructure throughout time. Considering the high economic prestige of Guangdong, the 
province with the most air-related pollution protests, impact could have reached the national 
level given the magnitude of these protests (specifically considering waste incineration). 
 
The Future of Environmentalism in China 
 Given the results of this experiment, I expect environmental protests to continue to 
increase in frequency over the next few years. As China continues to grow in both size and 
economic heft, the CCP will face numerous environmental challenges. This study demonstrated 
the impact of waste incinerators in Guangdong; several protests resisted their construction, and 
more of them failed than succeeded.  
 In Beijing, waste incinerator construction instigated three out of the four protests. Only 
one of those succeeded (though it took five years to succeed). Moreover, Beijing’s last reported 
protest occurred in 2012, begging the question as to why more protests have not made it to media 
outlets as they have in other provinces. While there is not any information that attempts to 
answer this question, I would posit that Beijing officials fear widespread dissent most in the 
capital city, and therefore potential activism is monitored more closely. If communities across 
China noticed environmental unrest occurring in Beijing, it may inspire activists to act out more 
often, or more aggressively. I will also, then, argue that this trend will continue. News reports 
will likely keep environmental activism in Beijing, and other forms of activism for that matter, 
under wraps. Additionally, Chinese companies are preparing to build more coal-powered plants 
both inside and outside of China, which could prove detrimental both to its commitment to the 
Paris Agreement and the patience of China’s citizens (Urgewald, 2017).  
 
71 
 
 Considering the trends displayed in this study, I contend that air pollution protest will 
continue as the most prevalent form of pollution for activists to demonstrate against. Given the 
direction that the continental provinces in this study (Hunan and Sichuan) are headed, I expect 
that officials will experience difficulties when responding to protest demands. Outcomes will 
begin to tend more towards co-optation as citizens become more aware of the harmful 
consequences of nearby plants and factories, and subsequently cognizant of the most effective 
tactics to use in protests. The most successful tactic in this study, by far, is gathering in response 
to the construction of a plant or factory rather than against one that has already been built. This is 
not surprising. Shutting down factories and plants that are already built present the most costly 
alternative to responding to protest demands. If citizens begin to employ this method, I believe 
they will have more success. Additionally, cooperation with NGOs or other public institutions 
could prove fruitful. As I have mentioned in a previous chapter, public institutions have played a 
hand in the actual formation of the 2014 EPL (Zhang et al., 2016). Through closer interactions 
with these organizations, mass incidents could be curtailed, potentially avoiding violence and 
arrests, and government-citizen dialogue can be increased. 
 
Areas for Future Research 
 This study suffered from the limited availability of English-language reported cases. A 
replication of this experiment would include protests reported in Mandarin reported news sites, 
blogs, and other forms of media. Given this opportunity, the study would not be limited to the 
handful of websites that report environmental incidents. Rather, several other reporting mediums, 
such as private blogs and localized news agencies, could be used to develop a much larger 
dataset. Not only would this diversify and provide more validity to the study’s findings, the cases 
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themselves could experience separate accounts as more reports on the same incident are 
published. This anomaly occurred a handful of times in this study with regards to the size of the 
protest. In some instances, a report would set a cap at around 1,000 participants, whereas another 
report would claim the protest reached 100,000 people. Moreover, blogs and media outlets do 
not report on every single case of protest. Especially in provinces such as Hunan and Sichuan 
where Internet access is limited (Statista, 2016), it is more difficult for protests to emerge into the 
media. Gaining access to government records of the protests, while difficult, would help solve 
this issue. 
 Considering China’s ratification of the Paris Agreement (2016), examining 
environmental regulation enforcement over an extensive period since 2016 and the protests’ 
impact could help reveal if international involvement has assisted in developing China’s internal 
sense of environmentalism. Given the CCP’s claim to copious amounts of “green” initiatives, a 
study modeled in this way would determine to what extent China has implanted the conditions of 
a global agreement, especially in the context of an authoritarian state. A partial goal of this study 
was to provide insight as to democratic prospects in China given the widespread nature of 
environmental protests and the higher frequency at which they operate when compared to other 
protests. Moreover, Xi Jinping’s “New Era” ideology could be a significant indicator for the 
increased detention of environmental activism. Obedience and faith in the Party shines as a key 
beacon in this ideology, signaling a potential end to the heights that environmental protests have 
reached as outlined in this study. 
 Lastly, prospects for an operational social movement could be a topic of further studies 
when considering environmental activism. This experiment posited that the conditions were not 
yet present to consider China’s environmental activism as a full-fledged social movement. 
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However, framing this study under the conditions examining how social movements evolve may 
provide the field with a better understanding of how evolution occurs in modern authoritarian 
states. The case of China, undoubtedly a contemporary influence for developing states across the 
globe, could model how other states react to contention within their borders. 
 
Conclusions 
 The CCP will face a dire situation in the coming years as environmental protests begin to 
increase alongside scarce resources and public demands. China’s resource and environmental 
problems are no secret. The South-North Water Transfer Project, Beijing’s all-too-common 
smog “red alerts,” and verging desertification all contribute to the burgeoning issues Beijing will 
have to solve at some near point in time. The public, who carries the lion’s share of this burden, 
may soon run out of patience with the pace at which officials respond to and cover up 
environmental hazards. As this study shows, increasing environmental awareness and protests 
have assisted in pushing each level of government toward some responsive policy, whether 
through updated EPLs or the involvement of the public in environmental protection bureaus. 
 The primary issue now, as it always has been, lies in the central government’s ability to 
enforce these appeasement policies at the local levels. All too often, local and provincial officials 
fall prey to the temptation of heightening their economic production at the cost of public health 
and welfare. Due to this, local environmental protection bureaus will need to be given even more 
power in the next revision of the EPL; arguably, to carry out their own impact assessments at 
potential project sites, and take environmental offenders to impartial, uncorrupt environmental 
courts.  
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However, each level of government is also painfully aware of the balance that must be 
struck between public consultations and enforcement. If officials give in too easily, the public 
may demand more. Inversely, if authorities crack down too hard too often, they may face a 
ravenous public, or worse, criticism from the central government. Ultimately, the power to 
enforce and produce new rules will have to arise from the top, and close attention paid to the 
activities of officials near the bottom. I worry, though, that the CCP’s thirst for global prestige 
may overtake their attention to environmental concerns, as needs for production and economic 
growth increase. It may not matter if the skies rain gold or grime, so long as they are Red
 
75 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
76 
 
Appendix A: Protests Under Examination 
 
Location 
(province & 
city/county) by 
Year 
Pollution Type 
(Water, Air, 
Soil) 
Reported 
Estimated 
Size 
(people) 
Result William 
Gamson 
Classification 
Source 
2004 (2 cases)      
1. Sichuan 
(Pubugou) 
Water 
(groundwater 
pollution from 
dam 
construction) 
100,000 Thousands of authorities 
arrived at the site of protest to 
restore order. There was at 
least one casualty. 
Failure Temper, Leah, Daniela del Bene and Joan 
Martinez-Alier (2015) “Mapping the Frontiers 
and Front Lines of Global Environmental 
Justice: the EJAtlas” Journal of Political 
Ecology, 22, 255-278, retrieved from 
https://ejatlas.org/conflict/the-pubugou-dam-
development-controversy 
2. Hunan 
(Shutangshan) 
Air (pollution 
from Allicin 
plant) 
Not 
reported 
The site of the factory was 
relocated to Qingshan Xiushui 
in response to thousands of 
residents becoming sick from 
the factory’s fumes. 
Preemption Temper, Leah, Daniela del Bene and Joan 
Martinez-Alier (2015) “Mapping the Frontiers 
and Front Lines of Global Environmental 
Justice: the EJAtlas” Journal of Political 
Ecology, 22, 255-278, retrieved from 
https://ejatlas.org/conflict/shutangshan-village-
chemical-factory-pollution-in-hunan-province 
2005 (2 cases)      
3. Guangdong 
(Guangzhou) 
Water 
(cadmium 
mining 
operations) 
Not 
reported 
Officials suspended the 
plant’s operations until a more 
thorough environmental 
impact assessment could be 
carried out. 
Co-optation Jensen, Olivia and Ceema Namazie (2007) 
“Half Full or Half Empty? A Set of Indicative 
Guidelines for Water-related Risks and an 
Overview of Emerging Opportunities for 
Financial Institutions” UNEP Finance 
Initiative, retrieved from 
http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/hal
f_full_half_empty.pdf 
4. Hunan 
(Xiachoushui) 
Water (mining 
operations) 
1,000 No outcome. Authorities 
distributed meals to hungry 
protestors, and protests 
Failure Cody, Edward (2005) “China’s Rising Tide of 
Protest Sweeping Up Party Officials” The 
Washington Post, retrieved from 
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stopped. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/09/11/AR2005091101
681_pf.html 
2006 (2 cases)      
5. Beijing 
(Liulitun) 
Air (garbage 
incinerator) 
1,000 Officials cancelled the 
incinerator’s construction due 
to environmental hazards 
protestors brought up, which 
included a large gathering 
with protestors wearing 
matching t-shirts, calling for 
officials to end the pollution.  
Full Response Temper, Leah, Daniela del Bene and Joan 
Martinez-Alier (2015) “Mapping the Frontiers 
and Front Lines of Global Environmental 
Justice: the EJAtlas” Journal of Political 
Ecology, 22, 255-278, retrieved from 
https://ejatlas.org/conflict/protest-against-the-
plnnaed-liulitun-waste-incineration-power-
plant-haidian-district-beijing-china 
6. Guangdong 
(Shenzhen) 
Air (garbage 
incinerator) 
3,000 Officials cancelled the 
incinerator’s construction due 
to environmental worries. 
Protestors blocked traffic with 
posters proclaiming the 
incinerator’s potential toxins, 
and their detriments on health. 
Full Response Temper, Leah, Daniela del Bene and Joan 
Martinez-Alier (2015) “Mapping the Frontiers 
and Front Lines of Global Environmental 
Justice: the EJAtlas” Journal of Political 
Ecology, 22, 255-278, retrieved from 
https://ejatlas.org/conflict/protest-against-the-
plnnaed-qingshuihe-waste-incineration-power-
plant-luohu-district-shenzhen-china 
2007 (2 cases)      
7. Jiangsu 
(Wuxi) 
Water 
(chemical 
dumping) 
100s Officials closed factories 
around the lake and enacted 
efforts to clean up water 
sources in and around Lake 
Taihu, which would allow the 
once healthy fishing industry 
to continue years down the 
road. 
Full Response Temper, Leah, Daniela del Bene and Joan 
Martinez-Alier (2015) “Mapping the Frontiers 
and Front Lines of Global Environmental 
Justice: the EJAtlas” Journal of Political 
Ecology, 22, 255-278, retrieved from 
https://ejatlas.org/conflict/severe-water-
pollution-at-taihu-lake-jiangsu-china 
8. Sichuan 
(Pengzhou) 
Air (planned 
paraxylene 
plant) 
100s It appears the protestors’ 
concerns went unheard as the 
construction of the plant is 
still underway. 
Failure Temper, Leah, Daniela del Bene and Joan 
Martinez-Alier (2015) “Mapping the Frontiers 
and Front Lines of Global Environmental 
Justice: the EJAtlas” Journal of Political 
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Ecology, 22, 255-278, retrieved from 
https://ejatlas.org/conflict/controversy-over-
planned-paraxylene-px-plant-expansion-in-
pengzhou-sichuan-china 
2008 (3 cases)      
9. Beijing 
(Gaoantun) 
Air (garbage 
incinerator) 
Not 
reported 
The garbage incinerator is still 
in operation. 
Failure Johnson, Thomas. 2013. “The Politics of Waste 
Incineration in Beijing: The Limits of a Top-
Down Approach?” Journal of Environmental 
Policy and Planning, 15 (1),109-128, Hong 
Kong: City University of Hong Kong. 
 
10. Sichuan 
(Gaodong) 
Water 
(Manganese 
mining 
operations) 
Not 
reported 
Report indicates that 
government officials merely 
listened to the complaints of 
the surrounding petitioners, 
but continued with mining 
operations. 
Failure Zhou, Jiganang and Zhu Chuhua (2008) “In 
China’s Mining Region, Villagers Stand Up to 
Pollution” Yale Environment 360, retrieved 
from 
http://e360.yale.edu/features/in_chinas_mining_
region_villagers_stand_up_to_pollution 
 
11. Sichuan 
(Chengdu) 
Water 
(petrochemical 
plant operation) 
500 The police came and broke up 
the protest and arrested a 
handful of protestors, despite 
protestors’ signs of sickness 
and ailing health. 
Failure Blount, Pauline (2011) “Chinese Middle-class 
and Farmers Protest Petrochemical Plant in 
Chengdu (Chengdu Stroll), 2008” Global 
Nonviolent Action Database by Swarthmore 
College, retrieved from 
https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/chin
ese-middle-class-and-farmers-protest-
petrochemical-plant-chengdu-chengdu-stroll-
2008 
2009 (5 cases)      
12. Beijing 
(Changping) 
Air (garbage 
incinerator) 
100s The incinerator is still under 
construction as of 2017. 
Failure Temper, Leah, Daniela del Bene and Joan 
Martinez-Alier (2015) “Mapping the Frontiers 
and Front Lines of Global Environmental 
Justice: the EJAtlas” Journal of Political 
Ecology, 22, 255-278, retrieved from 
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https://ejatlas.org/conflict/asuwei-waste-
incinerator-in-changping-beijing 
13. Guangdong 
(Guangzhou) 
Air (garbage 
incinerator) 
1,000s The incinerator was relocated 
to a different district in 
Guangzhou, about 60 
kilometers away. 
Preemption Temper, Leah, Daniela del Bene and Joan 
Martinez-Alier (2015) “Mapping the Frontiers 
and Front Lines of Global Environmental 
Justice: the EJAtlas” Journal of Political 
Ecology, 22, 255-278, retrieved from 
https://ejatlas.org/conflict/panyu-waste-
incineration-project-guanzhou-china 
14. Hunan 
(Liuyang) 
Water 
(cadmium 
mining 
operations) 
1,000 The factory was shut down 
due to environmental hazards 
brought up in protests, such as 
the sickness, headaches, and 
nausea villagers experienced. 
Full Response Le, Yu and Pomfret, James (2009) “China 
Closes Factory After Cadmium Pollution 
Protest” Reuters, retrieved from 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-
protest-pollution/china-closes-factory-after-
cadmium-pollution-protest-
idUSTRE57216H20090803 
15. Hunan 
(Wugang) 
Soil 
(manganese 
contamination) 
1,000 The factory was shut down 
due to environmental hazards 
brought up in protests, such as 
the chronic lead poisoning 
several local villagers 
experienced. 
Full Response Pearce, Fred (2010) “As China’s Pollution Toll 
Grows, Protestors and Media Push Back” Yale 
Environment 360, retrieved from 
http://e360.yale.edu/features/as_chinas_pollutio
n_toll_grows_protesters_and_media_push_back 
16. Guangdong 
(Nansha) 
Soil (local oil 
refinery 
pollution) 
Not 
reported 
The refinery was relocated to 
Zhanjiang, about 420 
kilometers away. 
Preemption Qiu, Quanlin (2010) “Officials Feel Heat Over 
Waste Incinerator” China Daily, retrieved from 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-
01/26/content_9375511.htm 
2010 (3 cases)      
17. Guangdong 
(Dongguan) 
Air (garbage 
incinerator) 
600 The protest was ignored, and 
more incinerators are planned 
for construction in the future. 
Failure China Daily Staff (2010) “600 Residents Protest 
Waste Incinerator” China Daily, retrieved from 
Project”http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/20
10-05/18/content_9860151.htm# 
18. Guangdong 
(Guangzhou) 
Air (garbage 
incinerator) 
Not 
reported 
The protest was ignored, and 
more incinerators are planned 
Failure China Daily Staff (2010) “600 Residents Protest 
Waste Incinerator” China Daily, retrieved from 
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for the future. Project”http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/20
10-05/18/content_9860151.htm# 
19. Guangdong 
(Foshan) 
Air (garbage 
incinerator) 
Not 
reported 
The project was cancelled witj 
an official response stating 
that incinerators will not be 
built if they do not meet 
standards. 
Full Response Qiu, Quanlin (2010) “Officials Feel Heat Over 
Waste Incinerator” China Daily, retrieved from 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-
01/26/content_9375511.htm 
2011 (3 cases)      
20. Guangdong 
(Haimen) 
Air (coal-fire 
plant pollution) 
100s This power plant is still in 
operation. 
Failure Temper, Leah, Daniela del Bene and Joan 
Martinez-Alier (2015) “Mapping the Frontiers 
and Front Lines of Global Environmental 
Justice: the EJAtlas” Journal of Political 
Ecology, 22, 255-278, retrieved from 
https://ejatlas.org/conflict/huaneng-haimen-
coal-fired-power-station 
21. Guangdong 
(Haining) 
Soil (improper 
waste disposal) 
500 Officials forced the factory to 
shut down due to illegal 
dumping that protestors 
brought to their attention. 
Full Response Ogden, Chris (2013) Handbook of China’s 
Governance and Domestic Politics. Routledge: 
New York. 
22. Jiangsu 
(Nanjing) 
Soil (soil 
erosion) 
100s Project was cancelled due to 
protestor’s concerns over the 
construction’s detrimental 
effects on local soil and trees. 
Full Response Steinhardt, H. Christoph and Fenshi Wu (2015) 
“In the Name of the Public: Environmental 
Protest and the Changing Landscape of Popular 
Contention in China” The China Journal, 75, by 
The Australian National University, retrieved 
fromhttps://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/
files/h._christoph_steinhardt_and_fengshi_wu_
-_in_the_name_of_the_public_0.pdf 
2012 (3 cases)      
23. Beijing 
(Shenyang) 
Soil (radiation 
poisoning) 
300 The crowds dispersed due to 
the presence of police. 
Failure Blanchard, Ben (2012) “Rare Beijing Protest 
Takes Aim at High Speed Rail Project” Reuters, 
retrieved from 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-
protest/rare-beijing-protest-takes-aim-at-high-
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speed-rail-project-
idUSBRE8B802I20121209?irpc=932 
24. Jiangsu 
(Qidong) 
Water (paper 
mill pollution) 
1,000s Officials closed down the mill 
due to environmental 
concerns protestors brought 
up, such as the worsening 
condition of their drinking 
water. 
Full Response Wade, Samuel (2012) “Pipeline Project 
Cancelled After Protests” China Digital Times, 
retrieved from 
https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2012/07/pipeline-
project-cancelled-after-protests/ 
25. Sichuan 
(Shifang) 
Air (smelting 
pollution) 
100s Officials agreed to shut down 
smelting operations because 
local citizens did not agree to 
its operation.  
Full Response Temper, Leah, Daniela del Bene and Joan 
Martinez-Alier (2015) “Mapping the Frontiers 
and Front Lines of Global Environmental 
Justice: the EJAtlas” Journal of Political 
Ecology, 22, 255-278, retrieved from 
https://ejatlas.org/conflict/controvery-on-
copper-and-molybdenum-mining-shifang-
sichuan 
2013 (3 cases)      
26. Guangdong 
(Heshan) 
Soil (pollutants 
from nuclear 
fuel facility) 
Not 
reported 
The factory was closed down 
due to failed environmental 
impact assessment 
Full Response Qiu, Quanlin (2013) “Public Opposition 
Defuses Nuclear Plans” China Daily, retrieved 
from https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/2013-
08/23/content_16914993.htm 
27. Sichuan 
(Chengdu) 
Air (paraxylene 
plant) 
Not 
reported 
Authorities shut down 
protests before crowds could 
gain momentum, and allowed 
the plant to continue 
operating. 
Failure SCMP Staff (2013) “Government Toughens 
Stance on Environmental Protestors amid 
Kunming, Chengdu Actions” South China 
Morning Post, retrieved from 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/12414
74/governments-toughen-their-stance-towards-
environmental-protesters 
28. Guangdong 
(Puzhai) 
Air (garbage 
incinerator) 
100s Officials announced that plans 
for the incinerator were 
scrapped. 
Full Response Yang, Fan (2013) “Crowd Protests Planned 
Incinerator in China’s Guangdong Province” 
Radio Free Asia, retrieved from 
http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/crowd-
08292013112642.html 
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2014 (4 cases)      
29. Hunan 
(Taoyuan) 
Soil (aluminum 
plant pollution) 
Not 
reported 
Officials have not announced 
this plant’s closure despite 
obvious signs of illegal 
aluminum pollution, like red 
ground water.  
Failure Temper, Leah, Daniela del Bene and Joan 
Martinez-Alier (2015) “Mapping the Frontiers 
and Front Lines of Global Environmental 
Justice: the EJAtlas” Journal of Political 
Ecology, 22, 255-278, retrieved from 
https://ejatlas.org/conflict/chuangyuan-
aluminium-plant-pollution-in-hunan-china 
30. Hunan 
(Pingjiang) 
Air (coal-fired 
power plant) 
10,000 The plant’s construction was 
moved to another part of 
Pingjiang county. 
Preemption Temper, Leah, Daniela del Bene and Joan 
Martinez-Alier (2015) “Mapping the Frontiers 
and Front Lines of Global Environmental 
Justice: the EJAtlas” Journal of Political 
Ecology, 22, 255-278, retrieved from 
https://ejatlas.org/conflict/huadian-pingjiang-
power-station 
31. Guangdong 
(Maoming) 
Air (paraxylene 
plant) 
10,000s Officials announced that the 
plant’s construction was 
delayed in order to carry out a 
more specific environmental 
impact assessment in response 
to local protests. 
Co-optation Temper, Leah, Daniela del Bene and Joan 
Martinez-Alier (2015) “Mapping the Frontiers 
and Front Lines of Global Environmental 
Justice: the EJAtlas” Journal of Political 
Ecology, 22, 255-278, retrieved from 
https://ejatlas.org/conflict/controversy-over-
planned-paraxylene-px-plant-in-maoming-
guangdong-china 
32. Guangdong 
(Boluo) 
Air (garbage 
incinerator) 
1,000s Officials announced that the 
plant’s construction was 
delayed in order to carry out a 
more specific environmental 
impact assessment in response 
to local protests. 
Co-optation Temper, Leah, Daniela del Bene and Joan 
Martinez-Alier (2015) “Mapping the Frontiers 
and Front Lines of Global Environmental 
Justice: the EJAtlas” Journal of Political 
Ecology, 22, 255-278, retrieved from 
https://ejatlas.org/conflict/proposed-garbage-
incineration-plant-draws-mass-protest-in-
guangdong-china 
2015 (4 cases)      
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33. Guangdong 
(Luoding) 
Air (garbage 
incinerator) 
1,000 Officials cancelled plans to 
build incinerator in response 
to complaints from protestors. 
Full Response Temper, Leah, Daniela del Bene and Joan 
Martinez-Alier (2015) “Mapping the Frontiers 
and Front Lines of Global Environmental 
Justice: the EJAtlas” Journal of Political 
Ecology, 22, 255-278, retrieved from 
https://ejatlas.org/conflict/luoding-incinerator-
guangzhou-china 
34. Guangdong 
(Yangchun) 
Air (garbage 
incinerator) 
100s Authorities dispersed the 
protestors, and the incinerator 
is still in operation. 
Failure Zhen, Liu (2015) “Vehicles Damaged as 
Villagers in Southern Chinese Town Protest 
Plans for Incinerator” South China Morning 
Post, retrieved from 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-
politics/article/1866631/vehicles-damaged-
villagers-southern-chinese-town 
35. Guangdong 
(Heyuan) 
Air (coal-fired 
power plant) 
10,000 Officials approved the plant’s 
construction, despite its 
original suspension, to begin 
around 2018. 
Failure Lau, Mimi (2015) “10,000 Protest in Chinese 
City Over Planned Coal-Fired Plant” South 
China Morning Post, retrieved from 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/17650
10/10000-protest-chinese-city-over-planned-
coal-fired-power-plant 
36. Sichuan 
(Neijiang) 
Air (coking 
plant leak) 
1,000s The plant is still in operation 
and officials ordered reporting 
blackout of the protests. 
Failure Lin, Jing (2015) “Thousands Protest, Riot in 
China’s Sichuan After Coking Plant Leak” 
Radio Free Asia, retrieved from 
http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/leak-
04142015103014.html 
2016 (5 
protests) 
     
37. Sichuan 
(Chengdu) 
Air (paraxylene 
pollution) 
Not 
reported 
This plant is still in operation, 
as the planned protest had 
been cancelled due to heavy 
police presence at the planned 
site of the protest. 
Failure Tang, Frank (2016) “Planned Protest Against 
Smog in Southwest China Shut Down Before It 
Begins” South China Morning Post, retrieved 
from 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/20535
56/planned-protest-against-smog-southwest-
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china-shut-down-it-begins 
38. Jiangsu 
(Nantong) 
Air (paraxylene 
pollution) 
100s Officials announced that 
operations for this plant and 
28 others in the area were 
suspended to carry out 
environmental impact 
assessments. 
Co-optation Cang, Wei (2016) “More Jiangsu Pupils Fall Ill; 
Parents Protest” China Daily, retrieved from 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-
04/21/content_24714261.htm 
39. Jiangsu 
(Lianyungang) 
Soil (nuclear 
waste 
processing) 
1,000s Construction plans were 
suspended in order to carry 
out an impact assessment. 
Co-optation Cang,Wei (2016) “Nuclear Processing Site 
Suspended” China Daily, retrieved from 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-
08/11/content_26428615.htm 
40. Hunan 
(Nan) 
Air (garbage 
incinerator) 
100s Construction plans were 
suspended due to protest 
demands. 
Co-optation Associated Press (2016) “Chinese County Halts 
Plans for Trash Incinerator After Protest” South 
China Morning Post, retrieved from 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-
politics/article/1939546/chinese-county-halts-
plan-trash-incinerator-after 
41. Guangdong 
(Zhaoqing) 
Air (garbage 
incinerator) 
1,300 The report mentioned that 
authorities scattered the 
protestors and arrested 21 of 
them for questioning. The 
incinerator is still in 
operation.   
Failure Blanchard, Ben (2016) “China Detains 21 After 
Garbage Incinerator Protest” Reuters, retrieved 
from https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-china-
protests/china-detains-21-after-garbage-
incinerator-protest-idUKKCN0ZK08H 
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